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Abstract
This paper explores on a yearly panel of nineteen OECD countries from 1970-2001 the
eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on private consumption in recessions and expansions. In the presence of
binding liquidity constraints on households, ﬁscal policy is more eﬀective in boosting private
consumption in recessions than in expansions. The eﬀect is more pronounced in countries
characterized by a less developed consumer credit market. This happens because the fraction
of individuals that face binding liquidity constraints in a recession will consume the extra
income generated following a tax cut or government spending increase.
JEL: E62, E21, E32.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Several recent studies1 have examined the eﬀects that ﬁscal policy has on private consumption
and investment, identifying the government spending multiplier on output. However, what is not
accounted for by this literature is the possibility that ﬁscal policy can have diﬀerent eﬀects over
the business cycle. It can be less or more eﬀective as a policy instrument depending on the state
∗I am grateful to Roberto Perotti for his helpful comments and constant support. I also thank Michael J.
Artis, Omar Licadro, Emmanuel C.Mamatzakis and Miltiadis Makris as well as seminar participants at the Bank
of England, at the Macroeconomics Working Group (EUI), and conference participants at the 8th International
Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and International Finance (University of Crete) for their usefull suggestions
and comments.
†Address for Correspondence: Department of Economics, European University Institute, Villa San Paolo, Via
della Piazzuola 43, 50133 Florence, Italy. email: athanasios.tagkalakis@iue.it
1For example, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas and Mihov (2001), Perotti (2002), Mountford and Uhlig
(2000).
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than in muting booms2, alternatively it might be less eﬀective at lenghtening expansions than
at shortening recessions. Liquidity constraints can explain the asymmetric eﬀects of ﬁscal policy
over the business cycle. In recessions liquidity constraints become binding across a wider range
of households and ﬁr m s( t h eo p p o s i t ei nb o o m s ) .T h i sw i l la ﬀect ﬁscal policy actions, and their
propagation and transmission in the economy.
As Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2003) point out there is a consensus in the empirical literature
that government purchases have positive eﬀects on aggregate output; what has not been dealt with
i st h es i z eo ft h eﬁscal multiplier, i.e. whether it is above or below unity. To determine this, it
is the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on private consumption (the bigger component of aggregate demand)
that has to be examined. Private consumption behaves in a quite diﬀerent manner depending on
whether or not liquidity constraints bind.
Standard Real Business Cycle models predict that the wealth eﬀect of ﬁscal policy generates
adverse eﬀects on private consumption3. The presence of binding liquidity constraints alters the
implications of ﬁscal policy actions on private consumption. The wealth eﬀect of ﬁscal policy
weakens, because fewer people have access to credit markets. Thus, it is likely that private
consumption is increased after a ﬁscal expansion, amplifying the eﬀects of government spending
on output. This eﬀect is strengthened further in recessions when liquidity constraints aﬀect a larger
fraction of the population. Hence, ﬁscal policy could have Keynesian eﬀects (Gali et al (2002))4,
particularly in downturns of economic activity. In periods of expansion, liquidity constraints are
less likely to bind or bind for a smaller fraction of the population. Households prefer to save if they
are uncertain about their future income. Hence, a ﬁscal contraction, to avoid inﬂationary pressure
in the economy, would lead to stronger positive reaction of private consumption (because of the
stronger positive wealth eﬀect of lower future taxation, or because income uncertainty is reduced as
in Barsky et al (1986)5), cancelling the contractionary eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on aggregate demand.
2Sorensen and Yosha (2001) study whether state ﬁscal policy in the U.S. is asymmetric over the business cycle.
Their ﬁnding indicate that tax revenue increases more than spending in booms; whereas in slowdowns both revenue
and spending decline, but revenue remain at low levels for more time. The implication of their analysis is that state
ﬁscal policy (procyclical budget surpluses) mutes economic expansions to the same extent as it mitigates downturns.
3An increase in government spending, that has to be ﬁnanced by current and future taxes, will decrease private
consumption because the present discounted value of disposable income will be reduced by the higher taxation
(negative wealth eﬀect of taxation).
4M o r e o v e r ,a sl o n ga saﬁscal expansions lead to higher interest rates and lower asset prices, and people have
access to a whole range of interest bearing assets, then the wealth eﬀect could be even weaker in recessions (the
opposite in booms).
5In Barsky et al (1986) a decrease in distortionary taxation in the present period to be ﬁnanced by higher taxes in
the future will lead to an increase in consumption is future income is uncertain and individuals have a precautionary
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stylized two period theoretical framework, where three types of individuals coexist. Neoclassical
consumers that can “borrow and save”, Keynesian that can only save and rule-of-thumb (ROT)
consumers. We employ the assumption that government spending has a positive eﬀect on dispos-
able income. This is the case when government spending has a positive impact on output in the
presence of nominal or real rigidities. We study the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy in two cases of a two
period model. In the ﬁrst, liquidity constraints do not bind in the ﬁrst period; we refer to this as
“Good times”. Whereas, in the second, liquidity constraints bind, and this case is characterized
as “Bad times”. The main implication of the simple theoretical framework is that, under certain
assumptions, a ﬁscal expansion will generate a stronger response of private consumption in Bad
times compared to Good times. This eﬀect will be bigger, the larger the fraction of liquidity
constrained individuals
Turning to the empirical estimations, we use an unbalanced yearly panel data set (1970-2001)
of nineteen OECD countries. Periods of recession (Bad times) are characterized for each of the
countries, several alternative deﬁnitions are considered. Following work the by Jappelli and Pagano
(1994) and Perotti (1999), we use as a proxy of the degree of credit constraints, the maximum
ratio of loan to the value of house in housing mortgages (LTV ratio), and we assign pairs of
country-decades into high and low LTV groups. The next step is to extract the spending and tax
shocks that are aﬀecting private consumption in each state of nature and to categorize them into
expansionary and contractionary.
The empirical evidence conﬁrms the theoretical predictions suggesting that both a government
spending and a tax shock have a stronger positive eﬀect on private consumption in recessions
than in expansions. The eﬀect is more pronounced in countries characterized by less developed
consumer credit markets that are more likely to have a larger group of liquidity constrained
individuals. Furthermore, in countries with less developed consumer credit markets consumption
is aﬀected the most by expansionary spending shock and contractionary tax shocks in Bad times,
while in more ﬁnancially developed economies the eﬀects on private consumption are driven by
contractionary spending and tax shocks in Bad times, and by expansionary tax shocks in Good
times.
2 Motivation and Related Literature
The motivation for this paper comes from two adjacent ﬁelds of research. The ﬁrst is related with
the theoretical and empirical literature on the assessment of ﬁscal policy shocks, and its eﬀects on
saving motive.
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Non-Keynesian eﬀects, and implicitly or explicitly introduces a role for liquidity constraints in the
analysis.
As discussed above, following a government spending shock that is ﬁnanced by future lump-sum
taxes RBC models predict, through the negative wealth eﬀect, a decline in consumption and an
increase in employment that raises the return to capital and boosts investment. On the other hand,
the keynesian analysis predicts that private consumption will increase after a government spending
shock ﬁnanced by future lump-sum taxes, because disposable income increases. Investment may be
crowded out because the increase in consumption could raise the interest rate; though this depends
on monetary policy. Both models’ prediction could be in line with a ﬁscal multiplier bigger or
smaller than one. Nevertheless much of the empirical studies seem to conﬁrm the traditional
Keynesian view, ﬁnding a non-negative or positive response of private consumption to government
spending (e.g. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2002), Fatas and Mihov (2001)6).
In a recent contribution to the literature, Gali et al (2003), very elegantly, bring the above
approaches together by developing a dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices and
inﬁnite horizon optimizing, as well as, rule-of-thumb consumers (ROT)7. Conditional on having a
large fraction of ROT consumers (around ﬁfty percent of the population), and a high degree of
price stickiness (average price duration of about four quarters) they conclude that a government
spending shock generates an increase in aggregate consumption only if it is not very persistent;
otherwise the negative wealth eﬀect of higher taxation dominates. However, Gali et al (2003) do
not consider the possibility of having asymmetric eﬀects over the business cycle; which as we claim
will be driven by the presence of (binding) liquidity constraints.
The second ﬁeld of research relates ﬁscal policy outcomes to borrowing constraints. Several
papers (Perotti (1999), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996)) implicitly or explicitly add the as-
sumption that there exist credit market imperfections; hence both constrained and unconstrained
individuals coexist in the economy8. This implies that the wealth eﬀect of ﬁscal policy will be
stronger when the fraction of unconstrained individuals is high enough, so that ﬁscal consolida-
6However, Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2002) extending the standard RBC model with habit formation
and investment adjustment costs conﬁrm its predictions.
7Keynesian eﬀects of ﬁscal policy are possible when some individuals are not optimizing fully over long horizons
when choosing consumption, but follow “rules of thumb” that place a lot of weight on current income. It that case,
e.g. a bond-ﬁnanced tax cut will make them increase their consumption despite the fact that their lifetime budjet
constraint is not aﬀected.
8Studies of consumption behavior have suggested that the excess sensitivity of consumption growth to labor
income is an indication of liquidity constraints (Attanasio 1999).
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contrary, if the fraction of constrained agents is large enough, the wealth eﬀect weakens and ﬁscal
policy has Keynesian eﬀects [this eﬀect is stronger especially when the present discounted value of
future taxation is quite high (convex tax distortions)]. These Non-Keynesian eﬀects of ﬁscal policy
are more likely in cases of bad initial conditions10 i.e. high or growing debt-to-GDP-ratio (Perotti
1999), when the ﬁscal correction is large and persistent (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990, 1996). Crucial
is also the composition of ﬁscal consolidation (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 1997); an expenditure
cut has higher probability of success than a consolidation based on tax increases11. Nevertheless,
so far there has not been established a link between borrowing constraints that bind depending
on the state of the economy and ﬁscal policy actions that generate Keynesian or non-Keynesian
eﬀects.
3T h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k
Consider a simple two period theoretical frameowork (t=1, 2). Suppose that there exits three
types of individuals. Rule-of-thumb (ROT) consumers that consume their disposable income in
each period, LC type (Keynesian individuals) who are supposed to be liquidity constrained (can
save, but cannot borrow) and the U type (neoclassical individual) who are unconstrained (can
borrow and save). Following Perotti (1999) we assume the presence of nominal or real rigidities so
that ﬁscal policy has a positive eﬀect on output. With respect to timing we assume that production
takes place at the beginning of each period, while consumption and investment decisions take place
at the end.
We examine two cases. In the ﬁrst case, if the economy is in a Good state (expansion) in
t=1, it will pass to a Bad state in period t=2. In the second case if the economy is in a Bad
state (recession) in t=1, it will switch to a Good state in period t=2. The transition probabilities
are assumed to be 1, and are supposed to be known by all individuals at the beginning of period
t=1. During an expansion all individuals (except of ROT consumers) want to save, while during
a recession all (except of ROT consumers) want to borrow, though this is not possible for the
LC type of individuals. This way we abstract, for simplicity, from the real life phenomenon of
9Conditional on having a small expected increase in future taxes.
10Crucial is the assumption that politicians discount the future more than consumers, so that consumers perceive
the future tax burden as higher.
11Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) ﬁnd that non-keynesian eﬀects are more likely when taxes and transfers
change (however they focus on national savings). Moreover non-keynesian responses appear asymmetric and stronger
for ﬁscal contractions rather than expansion. Tax increases have no eﬀect on saving during periods of large ﬁscal
contractions.
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aﬀecting more people). However, incorporating both ROT and LC type consumers in the analysis
we can replicate some of the real life phenomena, because even in Good times a fraction of the
population will not have access to ﬁnancial markets, while in Bad times this fraction will increase.
Moreover, this will be relevant both for more and less ﬁnancially developed economies.
3.1 Individuals
There exists a continuum of individuals indexed by i  [0,1]. Af r a c t i o nλ1 of them is of the ROT
type, λ2 are LC type individuals, whereas the rest (1 − λ1 + λ2) are of the U type12.T h eUt y p e
individuals have full access (can save and borrow) to credit markets under all states of nature
at the going interest rate r. When savings are positive (in Good times), both U and LC types
invest in government securities and earn gross return equal to (1 + r). In Bad times, only the U
type individuals can borrow, and they repay in the second period. The LC types are constrained
to consume their disposable income. The ROT individuals at all times consume their disposable
income.
Both types of individuals own one unit of labor which they supply inelastically. In the ﬁrst
period individuals receive a real wage wG
1 or wB
1 depending on whether they are in a Good or
Bad state, moreover wG >w B, this assumption is considered to be a real life phenomenon since
wages are mildly procyclical. If in Good state at time t=1, then next period they receive wB
2 .
Analogously, if in Bad state at time t=1 then next period they receive wG
2 .
Each U type individual maximizes expected utility
EU(C1,C 2) (1)
where C1 and C2 are ﬁrst and second period consumption respectively and E denotes expecta-
tions conditional on information available at the beginning of period 1. U(.) is a von Neuman-
Morgenstern utility function. The government imposes lump-sum taxes (T) on all individuals,
except of the ROT consumers, in both periods.
The intertemporal budget constraint of the U type individuals when moving from Good to





2 − T1 − RT2 (2)
R = 1
1+r where (1 + r) is the real rate of return on savings13.
12We assume that total population is L = ¯ L =1 , i.e there is no population growth.
13For simplicity we assume that the rate of time preference equals the market rate of return.
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2 − T1 − RT2 (3)
When moving from Good to Bad times, the LC type individuals maximize a function like (1)





2 − T1 − RT2 (4)
analogously with the U types when considering the switch from Bad to Good times. Further-
more, the LC type individuals face the following complementary slackness condition:
µ1SLC
1 = µ1(w1 − T1 − cLC
1 )=0
µ1 ≥ 0
so when µ1 =0then SLC
1 > 0; the liquidity constraints14 do not bind and people want to save
i.e. we are in a situation of Good times; whereas when µ1 > 0, then SLC
1 =0 , so the liquidity
constraints bind, people would like to borrow but they cannot, i.e we are in a situation of Bad
Times.
The ROT consumers each period maximise15
U(Ct) (5)
with respect to the zero saving constraint cROT
t = wt, for t =1 ,2.
Finally aggregate consumption for t =1 ,2 is given by:
ct = λ1cLC
t + λ2cROT
t +( 1− λ1 − λ2)cU
t (6)
3.1.1 Fiscal Policy
We assume that the government “consumes” a quantity Gt, t =1 ,2 of the goods produced in the
private sector of the economy. Implicitly we assume that the economy is characterized by real
14There have been several ways of introducing liquidity constraints in the literature: (i) there is a wedge between
the borrowing and lending rates, (ii) the interest rate varies continuously with amount borrowed or saved, (iii)
there is an exogenous limit (could be zero) to the amount that they can borrow, (iv) there can also be a “natural”
debt limit which is the maximum amount that the individuals can repay, and is obtained if the consumer budget
constraint is solved with respect to the asset holdings and then is iterated forward; in this case the individuals can
borrow only a fraction of their natural debt limit.
15Alternatively, we could have assumed that the fraction λ2 of the population is very impatient so they always
prefer to consume more in the ﬁrst period.
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labor demand and output16.I tﬁnances its spending by imposing lump sum taxes on the U and
LC type individuals in each time period. In the ﬁrst period the government budget constraint is
G1 + B1 = T1, whereas in the second G2 = T2 +( 1+r)B1.B 1 is the stock of debt at the end of
period 1 and is deﬁned in real terms.
Next we discuss the type of discretionary ﬁscal policy action undertaken by the government.
First keep in mind the timing of events: following the realization of the productivity shock (we
call it A) that pushes the economy into a recession (ALOW) or an expansion (AHIGH), ﬁscal policy
actions are taken, then production takes place, at the end of each period comes consumption and
investment decisions. Before the government’s ﬁscal policy decision, individuals form expectations
of the government’s action in light of the productivity shock. Therefore the government sets the
public spending equal to
G1 = ¯ G1 + ρuG
1/A1 + εG
1 (7)
and the taxes equal to
T1 = ¯ T1 + φuT
1/A1 + εT
1 (8)
Where ¯ G1 = G + ηG0 and ¯ T1 = T + χT0, G0 and T0 represents beginning of period values before
the productivity shock takes place. Moreover E(G1)= ¯ G1 + ρuG
1/A1 and E(T1)=¯ T1 + φuT
1/A1.
This means that the individuals knowing the state of the economy correctly anticipate that the
government will respond setting spending and taxation to the above stated values (which are
composed of a ﬁxed part ( ¯ G1 and ¯ T1) and a part (uG
1/A1and uT
1/A1)t h a ti ss e ta c c o r d i n gt ot h e
realization of the productivity shock A), however they do not foresee εG
1 and εT
1 which represent
the unanticipated component of ﬁscal policy actions. Unanticipated as of the information available
to individuals following the realization of the productivity shock at the beginning of period t=1. We
employ this assumption because we want to analyze how individuals respond to ﬁscal shocks when
already in a recession or an expansion.
Analogously in the second period we have
G2 = ¯ G2 + ρuG
2/A2 + εG
2 (9)
T2 = ¯ T2 + φuT
2/A2 + εT
2 (10)
with ¯ G2 = G+ηG1 and ¯ T2 = T +χT1.M o r e o v e rE1(G2)= ¯ G2+ρuG
2/A2 and E1(T2)=¯ T2+ρuT
2/A2,
i.e. the individuals knowing the value of the productivity shock in the second period anticipate
(in period 1) part of the government’s actions that will be undertaken in the second period.
16Implicitly it is assumed that nominal rigidities faced by ﬁrms arise in an environment of monopolistic competition
with downward sloping demand curves and constant elasticity of substitution among ﬁrms’ products.
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severity and the type of the rigidities assumed17, while by assuming the presence of lump-sum
taxation we exclude any eﬀects of taxation on real wages.
3.2 Implications for Private Consumption
In this section we discuss what are the implications of these unexpected government shocks on
the private consumption of the three types of individuals. Keep in mind that we are examining
changes in consumption in period t=1 after the ﬁscal policy shock has occured, compared to what
would have been the case hadn’t the ﬁscal shock occurred, conditional on knowing the realization
of the productivity shock. The changes in disposable income are driven by the eﬀects of the ﬁscal
policy changes on real wages and taxation. The disposable income (Y ) is given by18:
Y1 = a1w1 − a2T1 (11)
with a1,a 2 > 0 (using lump-sum taxes can have a2 =1 ), w h i l er e a lw a g e sa r ea p p r o x i m a t e db y :
w1 = b1G1 + b2A1 + b3Φ1 (12)
we assume that b1 > 0.A 1 is the productivity shock and takes a low value in Bad times and a
high value in Good times, its coeﬃcient (b2 > 0) captures all the eﬀect a productivity shock could
have on wages and wage setting. Φ1 = ξΦ0+υ1 is a process that summarizes all remaining factors
that aﬀect wage setting, υ1 is a stochastic disturbance (uncorrelated with the productivity shock
and the ﬁscal shocks and not anticipated by individuals), Φ0 indicates beginning of period value,
prior to the realization of the productivity shock (b3 ><0). Using equations (7)-(8) and (11)-(12)
we can write the end-of-period t=1 disposable income as follows:
Y1 = a1b1(G + ηG0 + ρuG
1/A1 + εG
1 )+a1b2A1 + a1b3Φ1 − a2(T + χT0 + φuT
1/A1 + εT
1 ) (13)
Notice that what we want to compare the disposable income after all ﬁscal policy actions have
taken place with the disposable income after the realization of the productivity shock but prior
to any ﬁscal policy action. This change in disposable income in period t=1 can be separated into
an anticipated and an unanticipated component. The anticipated component is ∆Y1/anticipated =
Y1/anticipated−Y1/A1;w h e r eY1/anticipated represents the disposable income following the anticipated
17We employ the assumption that the economy is characterized by an upward sloping labor supply function. As
Lane and Perotti (2003) argue, an upward sloping labor supply curve arises as the equilibrium of a unionized labor
market, where each union deﬁnes a sector; that is the mass of ﬁrms for which the union sets the wage (Alesina and
Perotti (1999)).
18We assume that the lump-sum taxation does not aﬀect real wages.
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productivity shock but before the ﬁscal policy action is taken. The unanticipated component is
Y1 −Y1/anticipated = ∆Y1/ε1., i.e the value of disposable income at the end of period one minus the
value of disposable income following the anticipated ﬁscal policy change, this eﬀect is due only to
the ﬁscal shocks εG
1 and εT
1 and the stochastic disturbance υ1. Hence we can write:
∆Y1/ε1 = Y1 − Y1/anticipated = a1b1εG
1 − a2εT
1 + a1b3υ1 (14)
∆Y1/antic = Y1/anticipated − Y1/A1 = a1b1ρuG
1/A1 − a2φuT
1/A1 (15)
In the second period we have:
Y2 = a1w2 − a2T2 (16)
w2 = b1G2 + b2A2 + b3Φ2 (17)
A2 is the value of the productivity shock in the second period. Φ2 = ξΦ1 + υ2 is a process
that summarizes all remaining factors that aﬀect wage setting, υ2 is a stochastic disturbance
(uncorrelated with the productivity shock and the ﬁscal shocks and not anticipated by individuals),
Φ1 is the end of period one value prior to the adjustment of the productivity shock to its new
value in the second period. What is relevant for the analysis is not the end of period two value
of disposable income i.e. Y2, but the expectation in period 1 of the value in disposable income in
period 2,i . e . E1(Y2)=Y2/1. This implies that the ﬁscal shocks εG
2 and εT
2 and the stochastic
disturbance υ2 are not included since they are unanticipated as of the information available to
individuals in period one. Keep in mind that A2 is included (as well as the ﬁscal policy actions
implied by the new value of the A parameter) because we have assume that the individuals know
with certainty at t=1 the value of the productivity shock in period t=2 (i.e. if it will be a Bad or
Good period). Therefore compining (9)-(10) and (16)-(17) we ﬁnd that:
E1(Y2)=Y2/1 = a1b1(G + ηG1 + ρuG
2/A2)+a1b2A1 + a1b3Φ1 − a2(T + χT1 + φuT
2/A2) (18)
substituting (7) and (8) we have:
E1(Y2)=Y2/1 = a1b1G + a1b1η( ¯ G1 + ρuG
1/A1 + εG
1 )+a1b1ρuG
2/A2 + a1b2A1 + a1b3Φ1 (19)
−a2T − a2χ(¯ T1 + φuT
1/A1 + εT
1 ) − a2φuT
2/A2
Similarly the change in the second period’s disposable income following the shock can be sepa-
rated into anticipated and unanticipated components as of the information available to individuals
following the productivity shock at the beginning of the ﬁrst period. So the anticipated component
10
EUI WP ECO 2004/19is Y2/1antic − Y2/A1 = ∆Y2/1antic and the unanticipated component is Y2/1 − Y2/1unatic = ∆Y2/ε1.
Therefore:
∆Y2/ε1 = Y2/1 − Y2/1antic = a1b1ηεG
1 − a2χεT
1 (20)





Turning now to examine the changes in consumption we know that when moving from Good
to Bad times the U and LC types can save and thus smooth their consumption between the two
periods; hence under a quadratic utility function19, ∆C1 =
∆Y1/ε1+R∆Y2/ε1
1+R , i.e. the individuals
respond only to the innovations in the present discounted value of their disposable income. The
same holds for the U type individuals when moving from Bad to Good times because they can
smooth consumption. However, this is not the case for the LC type of individuals because of the
binding liquidity constraints. Therefore the change in consumption in period t=1 due to the ﬁscal
policy change equals the change in their disposable income in the same period: ∆C1 = ∆Y1 =
Y1 −Y1/A1 =( Y1 −Y1/antic)+(Y1/antic −Y1/A1) = ∆Y1/ε1 +∆Y1/antic i.e. it incorporates both the
anticipated and unanticipated components. The ROT consumers under both states of nature will
consume their disposable income in each period, therefore their change in consumption in period
one will be equal to their disposable income change (following the ﬁscal policy action) in the same
period (as for the LC types in Bad times).
Hence the simple theoretical framework employed implies that the ﬁscal policy actions will have
a positive eﬀect on the ROT individuals’ consumption as long as the eﬀect on real wages is positive.
In addition it have a positive eﬀect on the LC and U types’ consumption, if the positive eﬀect on
real wages outweights the negative eﬀect of higher taxation, leading to higher disposable income.
In addition the eﬀect on the LC types’ consumption will be bigger in Bad times because they will
face binding liquidity constraints and hence they will consume all their disposable income change.
Furthermore, anticipated ﬁscal policy actions will have a positive eﬀect on disposable income, if the
positive eﬀect on real wages is bigger than the negative eﬀect of taxation. This will imply that the
anticipated component of disposable income change will aﬀect private consumption in a positive
manner.
19This way we abstact from precautionary saving because the marginal utility is assumed to linear. However
allowing for convex marginal (U
000
> 0) utility of consumption will induce people who want to save to save more







1+ρ, where ρ i st h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n di sa s s u m e dt ob ee q u a lt or, so that R = β. Note that if
β>Rall individuals prefer to accumulate and consume at the very last period, since they are very patient (ρ<r ).
If β<R(ρ>r ) the individuals are very impatient and are disaving.
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Unanticipated ﬁscal policy changes are expected to have stronger eﬀects on private consumption
in Bad times when individuals face binding liquidity constraints and consume all their disposable
income change (induced by the unanticipated ﬁscal policy change). Hence, the bigger the fraction
of the liquidity constrained and ROT individuals in an economy, the more likely to have a positive
eﬀect of ﬁscal policy actions in recessions20. In addition, if a fraction of the population faces
binding constraints under both states of nature (like the ROT consumers that have no access to
ﬁnancial markets) then ﬁscal policy would be always more eﬀective in the countries having a bigger
fraction of liquidity constraint agents. Furthermore, disposable income changes induced by the
anticipated component of ﬁscal policy actions are expected to be more important in Bad times,
and more pronounced in countries with less developed consumer credit markets where a bigger
fraction of the population is expected to face binding credit constraints and follow a rule of thumb
consumer behavior.
4 Data and Empirical Strategy
The implications of the theoretical discussion are tested using an unbalanced panel of yearly data
from nineteen OECD countries21 from 1970 to 2001. The ﬁrst step in our empirical strategy is
to characterize the periods of recession (Bad times) for each country in the data set. The next
step is to consider the role played by credit constraints. It is expected that ﬁscal policy is more
eﬀective in economies with less developed consumer credit markets, with the eﬀects being much
stronger in periods of economic recession. Hence, crucial to the results obtained will be the use of
the right measure of the severity of liquidity constraints.
With respect to the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in Bad and Good times, there have been several
recent empirical studies22 that have contributed to the literature. The studies by Perotti (1999) and
20Alternatively, the more likely to have a smaller negative eﬀect if overall the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy actions on
consumption are negative.
21All variables are from the OECD’s Economic Outlook. Our data run from 1970 to 2001 for Australia, 1970-2001
for Austria, 1970-2001 for Belgium, 1970-2002 for Canada, 1970-2001 for Germany, 1981-2001 for Denmark, 1970-
2001 for Spain, 1970-2001 for Finland, 1970-2001 for France, 1970-2001 for the UK, 1970-2001 for Greece, 1970-2001
for Ireland, 1970-2001 for Italy, 1970-2001 for Japan, 1971-2001 for Netherlands, 1970-2001 for Norway, 1970-2001
for Portugal, 1970-2001 for Sweden, and 1970-2001 for the US.
22Gali and Perotti (2003) are examining the cyclical relation between budget variables and economic activity; to
this end they estimate ﬁscal rules using output gap as well as squared output gap in order to test for the presence
of any non-linearity on the sign and intensity of discretionary ﬁscal policy response. They argue that, so far, there
has not been any signiﬁcant change in the discretionary ﬁscal policy actions of the EMU members following the
imposition of the Stability and Growth Pact. Lane (2003), as well, discusses the role of ﬁscal policy over the
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the eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks on private consumption, however, it considers as Bad times the periods
with high or growing deﬁcit or debt to GDP ratio and not the periods of low economic activity.
Gavin and Perotti (1997) analyze the behavior of ﬁscal balance and government revenue and
expenditure in recessions and expansions in Latin American countries. They use two deﬁnitions
of recessions. Firstly, they characterize as recessions the years during which a country’s growth
rate is less than the average rate of growth minus one standard deviation of the growth rate series
for each country. Secondly, they characterize as deep recession episodes for the OECD countries
the periods where output growth is below -1. Therefore the current study diﬀers from the above
mentioned by the fact that we are analyzing the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on private consumption in
recessions and expansions by using several alternative deﬁnitions of Bad times.
We consider four deﬁnitions of Bad times. The ﬁr s tm e a s u r eo fB a dt i m e su s e di sb a s e do nt h e
cyclical component of real GDP and has been extracted by applying the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter
where the lambda coeﬃcient was set to 6. The dummy variable D1 takes the value 1 when the
cyclical component is negative, while it is zero otherwise. According to D1 there are (261) cases
of Bad times, and (274) cases of Good times. This is a measure of the “output gap”. The second
deﬁnition is the change in the cyclical component of real GDP; the dummy variable D2 takes the
value 1 when the change of the cyclical component of real GDP is negative and 0 otherwise. This
deﬁnition captures also cases where the cyclical component of real GDP is positive but declines
from one period to the other, though the cases where the cyclical component is negative but
increases (improves) from one period to the other are characterized as Good times. According to
D2 there are (251) cases of Good and (285) cases of Bad times. The third measure of Bad times
used is based on the cyclical component of unemployment rate, extracted as before by using the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter (the lambda coeﬃcient was set to 6). The dummy variable D3 takes the
value 1 when the cyclical component is positive while it is 0 otherwise; this deﬁnition generates
(270) cases of Bad and (265) cases of Good times. The last deﬁnition corresponds to the change
of the cyclical component of unemployment rate, so D4 takes value 1 when the cyclical component
cycle, focusing on the limitations for ﬁscal policy to act in a countercyclical manner in less developed economies.
Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) analyze the implication of fragmentation in determining ﬁscal outcomes in diﬃcult
times. To attain this they interact the political variables (number of parties, number of ministers and ideology)
that determine fragmentation of the political process with the change in unemployment. This way they capture the
implications of bad economic environment to the eﬀects of political variables on ﬁscal variables. In addition they
interact the above mentioned variables with a dummy variable that determines the state of public ﬁnances (as in
Perotti (1999) in order to determine the implications of bad initial conditions in terms of the debt/GDP ratio). The
results indicate that in periods of bad times,“when unemployment increases by 1%, the deﬁcit increases by 0.08%
of potential GDP more for every extra party or spending minister”.
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Good times. The last two deﬁnitions being related to the unempolyment rate can be characterized
as a milder deﬁnitions of the cyclical economic conditions, since unemployment might be high and
or increasing not only during periods with low or declining output growth.
Being constrained to used yearly data since ﬁscal variables are not available on quarterly
frequency for most countries, we prefer to use the above described deﬁnitions of Bad times so that
to generate enough Bad time data points. Using deﬁnitions analogous to Gavin and Perotti (1997)
produces not enough data points to carry over the analysis in Bad times. Moreover, when output
growth is negative, i.e. we are in a deep recession episode, all governments whether in a more or
less ﬁnancially developed economy are expected to provide a ﬁscal stimulus to the economy. This
implies that the eﬀect of ﬁscal shocks on private consumption in Bad times will be biased upwards
b yt h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁscal impulse will be of a bigger magnitude.
The deﬁnitions used capture relatively well the economic downturns that many countries have
experienced in the early 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.
TABLE 2: DEFINITIONS OF BAD TIMES
Dummy Deﬁnition 1 0 Total
D1 Cyclical component of real GDP growth>0 261 274 535
D2 ∆(Cyclical component of real GDP growth)>0 251 285 535
D3 Cyclical component of UnRate>0 270 265 535
D4 ∆(Cyclical component of UnRate)>0 245 290 535
With respect to the role of credit constraints on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy actions on private
consumption, we follow previous work by Jappelli and Pagano (1994) and Perotti (1999). We use
as a proxy for credit constraints the maximum ratio of the loan to the value of the house in housing
mortgages (LTV ratio). Jappelli and Pagano (1994) that have constructed this measure provide
an extensive discussion of why this measure is appropriate as a proxy for liquidity constraints
faced by consumers, even in countries where the credit to the private sector as a share of GDP
is relatively high23. Following, Perotti (1999) we assign each country-decade pair in high or low
LTV group, using a cutoﬀ value of 80 % for the LTV ratio. The countries already in a high LTV
group before 1994 are retained in the same group for the period from 1995 onwards, assuming (as
Perotti (1999)) that the LTV ratio does not decrease over time. The countries belonging to a low
23As Jappelli and Pagano (1994) argue, this is the case “because there is no necessary connection between the
degree to which credit is available to ﬁrms and the degree to which it is available to consumers”. Some useful
comparison of the LTV ratio and credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP, which is an index of ﬁnancial
intermediation for the economy as a whole, are presented at the Appendix (Table 9).
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group24.
4.1 Model Speciﬁcation and Estimations
As we have discussed above the U and LC types of individuals respond to the unanticipated ﬁscal
policy shocks. Moreover, the LC type individuals will respond also to anticipated changes in
their disposable income when they face binding liquidity constraints, while the ROT consumers
will respond both to unanticipated and anticipated disposable income changes under both states
of nature. Therefore, we should include a proxy of the “anticipated” disposable income changes
(∆˜ Y1/antic) that are induced by the anticipated component of ﬁscal policy actions. We expect that
this proxy will have more important eﬀects in Bad times than in Good times; because in Bad times
i ti sr e l a t e db o t ht oR O Ta n dL Ct y p ec o n s u m e r s , while in Good times it concerns only the ROT
consumers. Moreover, we expect that the proxy will have stronger eﬀects in countries with less
than with more developed consumer credit markets, because liquidity constraints will bind for a
bigger fraction of the population. Notice, that even if we do not distiguish between Bad and Good
times, and we consider only a categorization of more and less ﬁnancially developed economies
both the disposable income proxy and the unanticipated components of the ﬁscal variables should
have more pronounced eﬀects in the less ﬁnancially developed economies because it is more likely
that a bigger fraction of their population faces binding liquidity constraints in both recessions and
expansions, or that a bigger fraction of their population behaves as rule-of-thumb consumers.
Keep in mind that we are analyzing consumption changes induced by ﬁscal policy actions condi-
tional on the information available to consumers following the realization of the productivity shock
at the beginning of period t=1 (in order to study how individuals respond to ﬁscal shocks when
already in a recession or an expansion). Hence, the simple theoretical framework implies that the
U-type individuals always smooth their consumption (reacting only to the unanticipated compo-
nent of the ﬁscal policy change): ∆CU
1 =
∆Y1/ε1+R∆Y2/ε1
1+R , this is true for the LC types only in Good
times.W h i l ein Bad times their consumption change equals the change in their disposable income
(including both the anticipated and unanticipated component): ∆CLC
1 = ∆Y1/ε1 +∆Y1/antic. The
24Loan-to-Value Ratio: ratio of loan to value of house in average mortgage contract, from Jappelli and Pagano
(1994) and Perott(1999). The country decaced characterization reported in Perotti (1999) is: (High-LTV countries-
decades) Australia 1980-1994, Canada 1980-1994, Germany 1980-1994, Denmark 1970-1994, Spain 1980-1994, Fin-
land and France 1965-1994, UK 1970-1994, Ireland 1965-1994, Norway 1980-1994, Sweden, US (1965-1994). Country-
decades with LTV less than 80 percent: (low LTV): Australia 1965-1980, Austria, Belgium 1965-1994, Canada 1965-
1980, Germany 1965-1980, Denmark 1965-1970, Spain 1965-1980, Greece, Italy and Japan 1965-1994, Netherlands
1965-1994, Norway 1965-1980, Portugal 1965-1994. These high and low LTV groups for the sample used in the
current study are presented at the Appendix (Table 10).
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mated would be composed of two components, an unanticipated component which is determined
by the ﬁscal shocks εG
1 , εT
1 and the stochastic disturbance υ1, and an anticipated component of the
disposable income changes which is proxied by ∆˜ Y1/antic. Therefore, we will estimate the following







D1 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 in Bad times and 0 in Good times. εT
1 is the spending
shock and α1 g i v e su si t se ﬀect on consumption in Good times, while α4 g i v e su si t se ﬀect in Bad
times. εT
1 is the tax shock and α2,α 5 are its eﬀects in Good and Bad times, respectively. α3 and
α6 are, respectively, the Good and Bad time eﬀects of the disposable income proxy. While υ1 is a
stochastic disturbance that is uncorrelated with the ﬁscal shocks. Notice that the coeﬃcients of
ﬁscal policy variables in Good and Bad times capture the eﬀect on private consumption for the U,
LC and ROT type individuals. Whereas, the coeﬃcient of the disposable income proxy in Good
times captures the change in consumption for the ROT individuals; in Bad times the coeﬃcient of
t h ed i s p o s a b l ei n c o m ep r o x yi n c o r p o r a t e st h ee ﬀect of anticipated income changes on the private
consumption of the LC and ROT consumers. This setting captures in a simple way the real life
fact that some people face binding constraints both in recessions and expansions, furthermore,
these liquidity constraints bind for a bigger fraction of the population in recessions.
In order to construct the proxy ∆˜ Y1/antic, a n dt od e a lw i t ht h eendogeneity of current income
changes with the ﬁscal variables, we predict the “anticipated” disposable income change using only
lagged information. Notice that the disposable income proxy according to equation (15) should
capture the anticipated ﬁscal policy eﬀects on disposable income conditional on the realization of
the productivity shock (i.e. knowing the state of the economy at the beginning of period one).
Therefore we predict ∆˜ Y1/antic with the ﬁtted values (∆ˆ Yt) from the regression25:
∆Yt = ∆Yt−1 + ∆Yt−2 + ∆Yt−3 + ∆TLt−1 + ∆TLt−2
+∆Gt−1 + ∆Gt−2 + ∆Ct−2 + ∆Ct−2 ∗ cdum + cdum + tdum (23)
25The ﬁscal variables used are Gt: government consumption, Tt: total tax revenues (total direct taxes, social
security contributions received by the government and total indirect taxes). TL t: income and social security taxes
paid by employees. All variables are expressed in real per capita terms, for the ﬁscal variables we have used the
GDP deﬂator, whereas for private consumption and household disposable income we have used the deﬂator of
private consumption. Moreover, following Perotti (1999) we scale each variable by the lagged value of real per
capita disposable income (the argument for that is that a ﬁscal policy change will have diﬀerent eﬀects on private
consumption when government consumption or taxation is 10 percent or 40 percent of GDP).
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lagged values of ∆Yt,o nﬁrst and second lagged values of changes of government spending and cycli-
cally adjusted labor taxation (direct taxes and social security contributions paid by households),
and on the second lagged value of the change in consumption and its interaction with country
speciﬁc dummies (cdum) (see Perotti (1999)) in order to capture country speciﬁcc o n s u m p t i o n
dynamics. Finally, tdum are year dummies that control for global economic developments26.T h e
lagged values of the change in taxation and expenditure can be thought of capturing the antici-
pated eﬀects of ﬁscal policy changes on disposable income, while the lagged values of the disposable
income change control for the state of the economy.
4.1.1 Fiscal shocks
Next we discuss the estimation of the ﬁscal shocks. To get consistent estimates of the coeﬃ-
cients of (22) we need to exclude any feedback on ﬁscal policy variables due to economic activity.
Therefore, we should not consider the component of ﬁscal policy changes which is driven by cycli-
cal movements in economic activity. The focus should be on discretionary policy changes of an
unanticipated nature. Discretionary policy changes, as is discussed Gali and Perotti (2003), can
be decomposed into a systematic or endogenous component (systematic responses to changes in
actual or expected cyclical economic conditions) and an exogenous component (random changes
in budget variables (e.g. war spending etc). Perotti (1999) provides a discussion of whether it is
appropriate to talk about discretionary changes in taxation and spending with no feedback from
GDP when using yearly data. He claims that the assumption that policy makers do not respond
much to economic environment within a year is not unreasonable with respect to several govern-
ment spending components. However, it is quite likely that such kind of feedback will exist with
respect to taxation. Nevertheless, Perotti (1999) argues that “even if the estimated surprises are
not truly exogenous, this is likely to bias...the coeﬃcients of tax surprises upwards, both in Good
and Bad times,... but it is not clear why it should seriously bias their diﬀerence”27.H o w e v e r ,B a d
and Good times in Perotti (1999) correspond to periods of high debt and/or deﬁcit, not recessions
and expansions as in our analysis. In our case it is likely that ﬁscal policy might be conducted
in a countercyclical manner, being stronger in Bad times because an economic downturn is more
costly to policy-makers so they will choose to respond in a more decisive manner to adverse eco-
nomic conditions. This would imply that the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients of ﬁscal variables
26Diﬀerent speciﬁcations have been examined combining the use of unadjusted and cyclically adjusted measures
for ∆TL, as well as, including and excluding ∆Yt−2 ∆Yt−3.
27To deal with the feedback from GDP to changes in taxation, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) suggest as remedy
the use of quarterly data.
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ﬁscal policy interactions. This would also aﬀect the coeﬃcients of the ﬁscal variables, especially
in downturns of economic activity where the ﬁscal and monetary authorities might coordinate to
get the economy out of the recession.
To extract εG
1 ,ε T
1 ,the ﬁscal policy shocks, we perform OLS on the following system of equa-
tions28, where we are dealing with the above mentioned problems by adding two lagged values of
the change in real GDP (Q), as well as, including the lagged change in short term interest rate
(IRS)29:
∆Gt = a11 + a12∆Gt−1 + a13∆Tt−1 + a14∆Qt−1 + a15∆Qt−2 + a16∆IRSt−1 + εG
t
∆TLt = a21 + a22∆Gt−1 + a23∆TLt−1 + a24∆Qt−1 + a25∆Qt−2 + a26∆IRSt−1 + εT
t (24)
∆Qt = a31 + a32∆Gt−1 + a33∆Tt−1 + a34∆Qt−1 + a35∆Qt−2 + a36∆IRSt−1 + ε
Q
t
Therefore in the next step of our analysis the government spending shock will be ˆ εG
1 as estimated
above, whereas the cyclically adjusted tax shock is constructed as proposed by Blanchard (1993),




t TLt, φt is a weighted average of the GDP elasticities of direct taxes to
households and social security contributions paid by employees, i.e. the components of TL.These
elasticities are taken from OECD’s Economic Outlook (2003), Giorno et al (1995), and Van den
Noord (2002)30.
Notice that in order to capture the eﬀect of credit or liquidity constrained consumers we should
estimate equation (22) for the two LTV groups that represent diﬀerent degrees of development of
consumer credit and mortgage markets. The larger the fraction of liquidity constrained individu-
als, the stronger the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on private consumption. Particularly in Bad times when
liquidity constraints bind for more people (or when they are stricter). Hence, we expect that a
government spending shock, will have positive and stronger eﬀects on private consumption in Bad
times compared to Good times in countries characterized by less developed consumer credit and
mortgage markets. This happens because the liquidity constrained individuals being at a “corner”
28As in Perotti (1999) in each regression the constant is allowed to change in 1975. Moreover, we allow for a
post-Maastricht eﬀect on EU countries by allowing a diﬀerent mean after 1992, this captures more cooperative and
possibly more coordinated policies as well as trend towards ﬁs c a lc o n s o l i d a t i o ni nt h er u nu pt ot h eE M U .T h e
countries considered are: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden.
29Data for real GDP and short-term interest rate are from OECD, Economic Outlook and International Financial
Statistics of the IMF.
30Following work by Perotti (2002) we are assuming interest rate semi elasticities for taxes and spending equal to
zero.
18
EUI WP ECO 2004/19solution will consume their income increase that results as a consequence of the spending shock.
In more ﬁnancially developed economies, where the fraction of liquidity constraint individuals and
rule-of -thumb consumers is much smaller, we would expect that a government spending shock
has smaller eﬀects on private consumption compared to the less ﬁnancially developed economies.
Though, even for them ﬁscal policy might be more eﬀective in Bad times if the fraction of popu-
lation aﬀected by liquidity constraints increases in Bad times31.
Similarly a tax shock is expected to have a stronger negative eﬀect on consumption in periods
of economic slowdown compared to economic expansions, in less ﬁnancially developed countries.
The other side of the coin would be that a tax cut could boost private demand by much more in
downturns relative to upturns, in countries where access to consumer credit is limited. In countries
with more developed consumer credit markets the eﬀects should be of a smaller magnitude, still
though it is possible that a tax shock might have stronger eﬀects in a recession relative to an
expansion, as long as the fraction of the population that cannot smooth consumption increases in
Bad times.
Moreover, we expect that the disposable income proxy will have more pronounced eﬀects on
consumption in the low LTV rather than in the high LTV group, whereas it will be of a bigger
magnitude for both of them in Bad times. The ﬁrst result holds, as long as, a bigger fraction of
the population does not have access in ﬁnancial markets in the low LTV than in the high LTV
group. In addition the second result holds if the constraints bind for more people in both LTV
groups during Bad times.
4.2 Estimation Results
The analysis will be conducted in four steps. First, we will examine the implications of ﬁscal shocks
on private consumption in the whole OECD sample without making use of the LTV categorization
or the Bad-Good times deﬁnitions. This way we will get a better idea of what the results are for the
benchmark model using the whole OECD sample, and whether the categorizations that we shall
u s en e x tm a k es e n s e .A sasecond step we will analyze what are the implications if we consider the
two LTV groups separately (high and low), without considering the Bad times deﬁnitions. If there
exist consumers that have limited access to consumer credit under all states of nature then ﬁscal
policy will be more eﬀective in the low LTV group. The third step will be to consider the ﬁscal
policy actions taken in Bad and Good times for the whole OECD sample, without making use of
31We should also investigate whether ﬁscal policy actions have the same eﬀect on disposable income determinants
(wages, interest rates, asset prices, employment etc), on more or less ﬁnancially developed economies. Additionally,
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy actions on wages and employment will also depend on the extent of nominal and real
rigidities in each economy, independently of the consumer credit and mortgage markets development.
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policy on aﬀecting private demand over the business cycle, a useful benchmark for the ﬁnal step
of the analysis. The fourth and last step will be to investigate the role of liquidity constraints (as
proxied by the LTV indexed) in the transmission of ﬁscal shocks in recessions and expansions. In
all the above cases we will consider also the decomposition of ﬁscal innovations into expansionary
(when spending shocks are positive and tax shocks negative) and contractionary (when spending
shocks are negative and tax shocks positive) shocks32.
4.2.1 Fiscal policy in OECD countries
F i r s tw ep r e s e n tt h eb e n c h m a r km o d e lw h e r ew ea n a l y z et h ee ﬀect of spending and tax shocks on
private consumption using the whole OECD sample, without incorporating the LTV categoriza-
tion or the Bad time dummy variables. The model is estimated by the Prais-Winsten estimation
procedure allowing for a panel-level heteroskedastic AR(1) error structure33 with country and year
dummy variables. Table 1 displays a government spending shock has a very strong positive eﬀect
on private consumption, while the tax shock has a negative eﬀect of a smaller magnitude though.
Moreover, the disposable income enters with a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, according to
the theoretical discussion this should indicate the presence of liquidity constrained individuals.
Overall, the eﬀects are of a Keynesian nature. After using the categorization of ﬁscal shocks into
expansionary and contractionary components (results are presented in the Appendix) we ﬁnd that
an expansionary spending shock has a positive and quite stronger eﬀect on private consumption,
while a contractionary spending shock still has a positive but very small and insigniﬁcant eﬀect
on private consumption. These results are conﬁrmed by relevant Chi-square tests (table 11, Ap-
pendix). Both expansionary and contractionary tax shocks generate similar (negative) eﬀects on
private consumption, the contractionary tax shock has a slightly bigger and much more signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient34, though the Chi-square test performed does not reject the null of a common eﬀect in
both cases. Overall, spending shocks’ eﬀects present signiﬁcant asymmetry, with the expansionary
32The coeﬃcient estimate of an expansionary spending shock displays the eﬀect on consumption from a spending
increase, when ﬁscal policy is set in an expansionary manner. The negative of a coeﬃcient estimate of a contrac-
tionary spending shock gives the eﬀect in consumption following a decrease in government spending (or alternatively
the eﬀect on an increase in spending, when ﬁscal policy is set in a contractionary way). Similarly, the (negative
of the)coeﬃcient of an expansionary tax shock represents the eﬀect of a tax cut on private consumption, while the
coeﬃcient of a contractionary tax shock represents the eﬀect on private consumption following a tax hike.
33Alternatively, we estimated the model by pooled OLS allowing for heteroskedastic and autocorrelated of order
one error structure (Newey-West standard errors). The results obtained are qualitatively similar.
34The results are to be read as follows: an decrease in tax burden by 1% will increase consumption by 0.528%,
while an increase in tax burden will decrease consumption by 0.638%.
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t-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signiﬁcance, respectively.
The next step is to introduce the high and low LTV categorization and see whether the results
change in a signiﬁcant manner. The results are presented in the last two columns of Table 1
for each LTV group. The estimates after pooling the two groups are reported in Table 2. As
expected spending, taxation and the disposable income proxy have bigger coeﬃcient estimates in
the case of the low LTV group. However, only the spending shock has statistically diﬀerent results
between the two groups. The tax shock produces diﬀerent eﬀects in the two LTV groups, though
the diﬀerence between the two groups is statistically diﬀerent from zero only at the 20% level
of signiﬁcance. Therefore, ﬁscal policy shocks and particularly government spending shocks have












t(HLTV − LLTV ) 0.2431(1.34)
∆ˆ YtLLTV 0.7626(2.14)**
∆ˆ Yt(HLTV − LLTV ) -0.0837(-0.33)
Nobs 535
R2 0.3755
Nobs & R2 in the 1st regr. 544 (0.873)
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signiﬁcance, respectively.
35Considering the two hypotheses together, we are able to reject the null of common eﬀects when ﬁscal policy is
contractionary and expansionary (Table 11).
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have a positive eﬀect of a similar magnitude, but they are statistically insigniﬁcant. The expansion-
ary tax shock seems to have a much bigger impact on private consumption than the contractionary
tax shock, i.e. a decrease in taxation increases consumption by about the double of the absolute
value of a private consumption decrease following an increase in taxation. However, relevant
Chi-square tests do not conﬁrm this results. Both spending and tax shocks of expansionary and
contractionary nature are of a bigger magnitude in the low-LTV group. Expansionary spending
shocks have a much more pronounced, positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on private consumption, com-
pared to contractionary spending shocks. While it is contractionary tax shocks that appear to
have a signiﬁcant impact on consumption. Though, the Chi-square tests reported support only
the case of diﬀerent spending eﬀects and not tax eﬀects. However, considering both hypotheses
together we are able to reject the null of common eﬀects when ﬁscal policy is expansionary and
contractionary. Furthermore, after pooling all observations as table 12 (appendix) displays expan-
sionary spending shocks in the low-LTV group are the driving force of the asymmetry between the
eﬀects of spending shocks in OECD countries (the expansionary spending shocks are of a much
bigger magnitude in the low-LTV group). In addition, there is signiﬁcant asymmetry in the eﬀects
of a contractionary tax shock between the two LTV groups, with the eﬀect being almost three
times bigger in absolute value in the case of the low-LTV group. Hence, an increase in spending
and an increase in taxation are translated into much bigger consumption changes in the low-LTV
group, that is characterized by less developed consumer credit markets, than in the high LTV
group.
Before turning to examine the role of liquidity constraints in the transmission of ﬁscal shocks
in recessions and expansions, we analyze how tax and spending shocks aﬀect private consumption
in recessions and expansions in all the nineteen OECD countries considered. This way we will get
a better picture of the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy over the business cycle; the results will serve as
a useful benchmark so as to evaluate the eﬀect that the interaction of the degree of development of
consumer credit markets (as described by the LTV ratio) with ﬁscal policy shocks have on private
consumption in upturns and downturns of economic activity.
We estimate two versions of the model. In the ﬁrst one, according to our simple theoretical
framework, the proxy ∆ˆ Yt captures the eﬀects of anticipated income changes on private consump-
tion of liquidity constraited individuals. While in the second ∆ˆ Yt is allowed to have a diﬀerent
eﬀect in Bad and Good times, i.e. allow for liquidity constraints to bind both in Good and Bad
times; we expect though the result to be stronger in Bad times. In both cases we include a full
set of country and year dummy variables. Tables 3 and 4 present the estimates that correspond
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When examining D1, we see that spending shocks have a positive eﬀect on private consumption
which much more pronounced in Bad times. Tax shocks, have a negative eﬀect in both states of
nature with their eﬀect being stronger and more signiﬁcant in Bad times. The disposable income
proxy has a bigger eﬀect in economic recessions. Though, Chi-square tests indicate that only
the eﬀect of the spending shock has statistically diﬀerent eﬀects in Good and Bad times. The
results under the second deﬁnition of Bad times (D2) follow a similar pattern. The spending
shock has positive and more signiﬁcant eﬀects in Bad times, similarly for taxation, however in
Good times the eﬀect is positive, though not signiﬁcant. The disposable income proxy appears
to have more pronounced eﬀects in Good times. Nevertheless, keep in mind that this deﬁnition
captures the relative change compared to the last period’s state of nature, i.e. when our output gap
indicator (the ﬁrst deﬁnition of Bad times) implies that we are in a recession for two consecutive
periods, despite an improvement in the output gap measure from one period to the other, this
deﬁnition evaluating the relative change of the output gap measure will classify the current period
as Good times. Analogously when in Good times according to the output gap measure, with the
performance of the output gap deteriorating between two consecutive periods, then this deﬁnition
will classify the current state as Bad times. Therefore the estimates under this deﬁnition capture
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy actions on private consumption when the state of the economy improves
or deteriorates without actually being in a recession or economic expansion according to the output
gap measure used.
After decompositing the ﬁscal shocks in expansionary and contractionary, in case of deﬁnition
D1, we see (table 13 Appendix) that an expansionary spending shock generates a bigger (positive)
impact eﬀect on private consumption than a contractionary spending shock when in Bad times.
So an increase in spending aﬀects consumption (positively) by much more than a corresponding
decrease in when in Bad times, this appears not to be the case in Good times as can be seen by
relevant Chi-square tests that were performed. Moreover, there is a statisticallly signiﬁcant and
much bigger (positive) eﬀect on private consumption following an expansionary spending shock
in Bad than in Good times. An expansionary and contractionary tax shock does not produce
statistically diﬀerent eﬀects in Bad times. In Good times there is an indication of asymmetric
eﬀects, with bigger coeﬃcient (in absolute values) for the case of an expansionary tax shock, though
the relavant test performed does not reject the null of a common coeﬃcient for expansionary and
contractionary tax shocks. While, contractionary tax shocks have a bigger (negative) and more
signiﬁcant impact eﬀect on private consumption in Bad times, than in Good times. Whereas,
for expansionary tax shocks we cannot reject the null of a common eﬀect both in Bad and Good
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Considering deﬁnition D2, that describes when the state of the economy improves or deteri-
orates without actually being in a recession or economic expansion, as table 13 (in Appendix)
displays the results with respect to expansionary and contractionary shocks are qualitatively the
same with those for deﬁnition D1. With respect to tax changes the most signiﬁcant eﬀect comes
from contractionary tax shocks in Bad times, and expansionary tax shocks in Good times, in
addition some of the other coeﬃcient estimates alter (tables 13 and 13.1)36.
TABLE 3
V a r i a b l e s D 1D 1D 2 D 2
ε
g
tBad 3.6949(3.62)*** 3.8225(3.82)*** 3.4775(3.32)*** 2.9015(2.79)***
ε
g
tGood 0.7130(0.88) 0.3064(0.41) 0.6473(0.89) 0.9904(1.46)
εt
tBad -0.5711(-3.61)*** -0.6199(-3.90)*** -0.4909(-2.93)*** -0.3390(-1.97)**
εt
tGood -0.3422(-1.00) -0.2012(-0.62) 0.2918(1.08) 0.2468(0.94)
∆ˆ Yt 0.7467(2.27)** - 0.7804(2.56)** -
∆ˆ YtBad - 0.8351(2.48)** 0.5679(1.88)*
∆ˆ YtGood - 0.6000(1.74)* 0.9928(3.19)***
Nobs 535 535 535 535
NofBad Times 261 261 251 251
R2 0.368 0.386 0.402 0.471
X2(and p-values):bg=gg 5.22(0.0224) 7.88(0.0050) 4.78(0.0288) 2.33(0.1268)
X2 :bt=gt 0.36(0.5477) 1.32(0.2505) 6.32(0.0120) 3.50(0.0613)
X2 : b∆ˆ Yt = g∆ˆ Yt - 1.18(0.2779) - 3.64(0.0566)
Adj.R2 & Nobs 1st regr. 0.873 (544) 0.873 (544)
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
The D3 and D4 deﬁnitions that are based on the unemployment rate and describe milder
36Though the eﬀects of the tax shocks alter. In this case a contractionary tax shock in Bad times generates
a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on consumption as before, while the expansionary tax shock has now a positive
but still not signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (i.e. an increase in taxation, as part of a contractionary policy, in Bad times
decreases consumption, while a decrease in taxation in Bad times, as part of an expansionary policy, decreases
consumption). As before an expansionary tax shock generates a much stronger eﬀect than a contractionary tax
shock in Bad times, i.e. a decrease in taxation as part of an expansionary policy (the point estimate times -1)
increases consumption by much more (and in a more signiﬁcant manner) compared to the change in consumption
following a tax increase as part of a contractionary policy. Furthermore, a contractionary tax policy in Bad times
decreases consumption signiﬁcantly, whereas a similar policy in Good times generates positive but very insigniﬁcant
eﬀects. While an expansionary tax policy (decrease in taxation) in Good times generates a positive and signiﬁcant
reaction in consumption, though in Bad times the eﬀect is of the opposite sign but not signiﬁcant.
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are of a smaller magnitude and not as signiﬁcant as before, especially with respect to the D4
deﬁnition. The eﬀects for the tax variable are analogous to D2. The disposable income proxy, as
above, produces positive and more signiﬁcant eﬀects in Bad times.
TABLE 4
V a r i a b l e s D 3D 3D 4D 4
ε
g
tBad 1.8343(1.83)* 2.2484(2.38)** 1.0802(1.24) 1.2322(1.43)
ε
g
tGood 0.5958(0.73) 0.1963(0.26) 0.1103(0.15) -0.0463(-0.07)
εt
tBad -0.5305(-3.77)*** -0.6185(-4.53)*** -0.5127(-3.89)*** -0.5373(-4.03)***
εt
tGood 0.0426(0.22) 0.1368(0.74) 0.2134(1.25) 0.2546(1.51)
∆ˆ Yt 0.6529(2.01)** - 0.6806(2.27)**
∆ˆ YtBad - 0.8300(2.48)** - 0.7232(2.34)**
∆ˆ YtGood - 0.5270(1.62) - 0.6167(1.91)*
Nobs 535 535 535 535
NofBad Times 270 270 245 245
R2 0.437 0.475 0.493 0.497
X2(and p-values):bg=gg 0.89(0.3456) 2.79(0.0950) 0.71(0.3983) 1.38(0.2404)
X2 :bt=gt 6.13(0.0133) 10.95(0.0009) 11.91(0.0006) 13.94(0.0002)
X2 : b∆ˆ Yt = g∆ˆ Yt - 2.08(0.1488) 0.28(0.5968)
Adj.R2 & Nobs 1st regr. 0.873 (544) 0.873 (544)
t-statistics in parethesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
As far as deﬁnition D3 is concerned we see (table 14) that expansionary ﬁscal shock produce a
strong and signiﬁcant positive eﬀect in Bad times, which is of a bigger magnitude and statistically
diﬀerent than in Good times but it is not statistically diﬀerent from the eﬀects of contractionary
spending shock in Bad times. As far as taxation is concerned, both contractionary and expan-
sionary tax shocks generate similar magnitude eﬀects in Bad times, while the contractionary tax
shock (a decrease in taxation; the negative of the coeﬃcient) increases consumption and generates
as t a t i s t i c a l l yd i ﬀerent eﬀect compared to Good times. Notice that in this case tax shocks have
insignicant eﬀect in Good times.
I nt h ec a s eo fd e ﬁnition D4, the results obtained after the decomposition of ﬁscal shocks into
expansionary and contractionary are much less signiﬁcant than before (and expansionary spending
shocks in Bad times have negative sign, contrary to what we have seen so far), and as relevant
Chi-square tests display only the eﬀects of contractionary tax shocks diﬀer signiﬁcantly in Bad
and Good times, i.e. in Bad times an increase in taxation decreases consumption, while in Good
25
EUI WP ECO 2004/19times it increases consumption though in a not signiﬁcant manner. Expansionary tax shocks in
Bad times are also signiﬁcantly estimated, in this case a tax cut (the negative of the coeﬃcient
estimate) increases consumption, however as Chi-square tests suggest the eﬀect on consumption
is not statistically diﬀerent in terms of magnitude from that caused by a tax hike in Bad times.
Overall ﬁscal policy appears to have Keynesian eﬀects on private consumption in Bad times for
the whole OECD sample. A tax cut in downturns increases private consumption more than a tax
cut in upturns of economic activity, whereas a spending shock genetates much more pronounced
eﬀects in periods of reduced economic activity. Furthermore, if we consider deﬁnitions D1 and
D3 that correspond solely to periods of economic recession the results obtained point to the
following: Expansionary spending shocks in Bad times are more important in generating positive
eﬀects in consumption and diﬀer signiﬁcantly both with respect to the corresponding eﬀects in
Good times and the eﬀects of a contractionary spending shock in Bad times. With respect to
taxation, expansionary tax shocks in Good times (a decrease in taxation, i.e. the negative of the
coeﬃcient estimate) raise signiﬁcantly consumption, mainly for D1 (though the magnitude of the
eﬀect does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the eﬀect in consumption caused by a tax hike as part of a
contractionary tax policy in Good times); while a contractionary tax shock in Bad times generates a
signiﬁcant reduction in private consumption, which is statistically diﬀerent from the corresponding
eﬀect in Good times, but not stastically diﬀerent from the magnitude eﬀect of a expansionary tax
shock (a tax cut) in Bad times. This implies that ﬁscal policy (particularly an expansionary
spending shock) is more eﬀective in mitigating economic slumps rather than in muting booms,
with respect to its eﬀect on private consumption. As far as taxation is concerned we see that tax
eﬀects on consumption are stronger in Bad times particularly because tax shocks, contractionary
or expansionary, are equally important in Bad times, while contractionary shocks aﬀect more
private consumption relative to their corresponding eﬀect in Good times. Alternatively we could
say that government spending is a more eﬀective mechanism in shortening recession episodes than
lengthening expansions in OECD countries, whereas tax policy has very negative eﬀects on private
economic activity if pursued in a contractionary manner in Bad times than in Good times, whereas
there are no signiﬁcant indications that it produces asymmetric eﬀects (in terms of the magnitude
of the coeﬃcient) in Bad times if pursued in a contractionary (tax hike) or expansionary (tax cut)
way (in case of a tax hike consumption decreases, the opposite in case of a tax cut, but the result
is of a symmetric nature.). These results can be explained by two factors. The ﬁrst is that liquidity
constraints bind for a fraction the population in all OECD countries during Bad times, so that
unanticipated ﬁscal policy actions that increase or decrease disposable income will induce them to
consume more or less, respectively. The second has to do with the way ﬁscal policy is practiced
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stronger in recessions because downturns are more costly for policy makers, hence they are more
likely to respond with a more pronounced ﬁscal policy action37. Next, we will evaluate whether
the LTV categorization captures eﬀectively the implications of credit constraints, however, there
is no particular reason why ﬁscal policy actions (in Bad times) might be of a bigger magnitude in
economies with more or less developed consumer credit markets.
4.2.1.1 The eﬀects of credit constraints in recessions and expansions In this section
we will examine the eﬀects of consumer credit availability on the way that ﬁscal policy aﬀects
consumption behavior. Consumer credit availability is determined, as noted, by the LTV ratio38.
The results presented on Table 5 make use of the D1 deﬁnition of Bad times and refer to the high
and low LTV groups. A government spending shock aﬀects in a positive and signiﬁcant manner
private consumption in Bad times with respect to the high LTV group; though in Good times its
eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant, and the coeﬃcient has a negative sign. The tax variable has
an e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect which appears to be of a similar magnitude in both Good and
B a dt i m e s .T h ed i s p o s a b l ei n c o m ep r o x ye n t e r sw i t hap o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant coeﬃcient both in
Good and Bad times, though its eﬀect is bigger in Good times. Fiscal policy is more eﬀective with
respect to the low LTV group. A government spending shock has a much bigger and statistically
signiﬁcany coeﬃcient in Bad times, on top of that the tax shocks have a bigger eﬀect and are
statistically signiﬁcant only in Bad times. The disposable income proxy has a bigger eﬀect on
private consumption in the low LTV group, with its eﬀect being more pronounced, as expected,
in Bad times. However, it is only the spending shock that appears to have statistically diﬀerent
eﬀects (at conventional levels of statistical signiﬁcance) on private consumption in Bad and Good
times.
Therefore, spending shocks have more pronounced eﬀects in Bad times for both LTV groups,
though the magnitude of the coeﬃcients is much bigger when considering the low LTV group. Tax
shocks have a bigger coeﬃcient for the low LTV group rather than the high LTV group, however,
in both cases we cannot reject the null of a similar eﬀect in Good and Bad times. Analogously, the
37However, in a recent study Perotti and Gali (2003) claim that ﬁscal policy has not always been conducted in a
countercyclical manner for all the OECD countries.
38As before we estimate two versions of equation (7). The ﬁrst one imposes a common ∆ˆ Yt in Good and Bad times,
while in the second ∆ˆ Yt is allowed to have a diﬀerent eﬀect in upturns and downturns. A full set of country and
year dummy variables have been included, and the estimation is conducted for a high and a low LTV country-year
groups. The Prais-Winsten estimation procedure that allows for panel-level heteroskedastic AR(1) error structure
was used. Qualitatively similar results were obtained when we estimated the model with pooled OLS with Newey-
West standards errors.
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income proxy has a stonger eﬀect in Good times for the high LTV group, whereas its eﬀect is
bigger in Bad times for the low LTV group (though only at the 20% percent level of signiﬁcance).
TABLE 5: D1
Variables 1 234
- H-LTV H-LTV L-LTV L-LTV
ε
g
tBad 0.5255(2.73)*** 0.4932(2.60)*** 4.7018(3.89)*** 4.9059(4.12)***
ε
g
tGood -0.0641(-0.040) -0.0690(-0.44) 1.3697(1.05) 0.5108(0.39)
εt
tBad -0.2185(-2.47)** -0.2327(-2.70)*** -0.7016(-3.97)*** -0.7611(-4.28)***
εt
tGood -0.1868(-2.52)** -0.2013(-2.78)*** -0.5507(-0.67) -0.2401(-0.30)
∆ˆ Yt 0.4139(4.84)*** - 0.7589(2.15)** -
∆ˆ YtBad - 0.2750(2.77)** - 0.8475(2.40)**
∆ˆ YtGood - 0.4841(5.38)*** - 0.5599(1.50)
Nobs 302 302 233 233
NofBad Times 149 149 112 112
R2 0.528 0.535 0.443 0.465
X2 (and p-values) for bg=gg 5.49(0.0191) 5.15(0.0232) 3.61(0.0574) 6.16(0.0131)
X2 :bt=gt 0.08(0.7765) 0.08(0.7723) 0.03(0.8565) 0.42(0.5192)
X2 : b∆ˆ Yt = g∆ˆ Yt - 6.45(0.0111) - 1.73(0.1883)
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
Decomposing the ﬁscal shocks into their expansionary and contractionary components we see
that with respect to the high-LTV group the contractionary spending shock produces bigger and
signiﬁcant eﬀects on private consumption in Bad times, moreover its eﬀect is statistically diﬀerent
from the corresponding eﬀect in Good times, as well as the eﬀect of the expansionary spending
shock during Bad times (tables15 and 15.1, Appendix). We can interpet this result in two ways,
ﬁrstly that a spending cut in Bad times reduces to a much greater extent private consumption,
than the corresponding pick up in consumption following an increase in spending in Bad times.
A second interpretation is that a spending increase during a period of Bad times where ﬁscal
policy has been conducted in a contractionary way generates much bigger, positive, eﬀects in
private consumption. Contractionary tax shock in Bad times generate strong negative eﬀects in
private consumption, but they do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in terms of magnitude from expansionary
tax shocks in Bad times. Whereas, in Good times it is expansionary tax shocks that aﬀect
the signiﬁcantly private consumption, though still their magnitude does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
compared to contractionary tax changes. Furthermore, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
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conﬁrming the result obtained before.
Expansionary spending shocks in Bad times are the most important factor that aﬀects private
consumption in the low-LTV group, and it is statistically diﬀerent from contractionary spending
shocks in Bad times, and expansionary spending shocks in Good times. In addition, as for the high-
LTV group, contractionary tax shocks in Bad times aﬀect in a signiﬁcant manner consumption
changes, though its eﬀect diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the corresponding eﬀect of a expansionary tax
shock in Bad times. Hence, a tax hike in Bad times reduces consumption, but not more that the
corresponding increase in consumption following a tax cut in Bad times. Therefore, the bigger
source of asymmetry comes from the spending shocks, with the contractionary component being
more inﬂuential in the high LTV group and the expansionary component in the low-LTV group.
Turning now to examine the results (Table 6) obtained using the second deﬁnition of Bad
times (D2), we see that with respect to the high LTV group spending shocks are not signiﬁcant
and have smaller coeﬃcients. Tax shocks have signiﬁcant eﬀects of a relatively bigger size in Bad
times, though relevant Chi-square test indicate that we cannot reject the null of a similar eﬀect
in Good and Bad times. The disposable income proxy appears to be more signiﬁcant in Good
times. When considering the low-LTV group we see that both the spending and tax shocks have
much stronger eﬀects in Bad times (only when we do not separate the eﬀect that the disposable
income proxy has on Good and Bad times), with their eﬀects in Good times being insigniﬁcantly
estimated. Contrary to what expected the disposable income proxy has a bigger eﬀect in Bad
times under the deﬁnition used.
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Variables 123 4
- H-LTV H-LTV L-LTV L-LTV
ε
g
tBad 0.1883(0.86) 0.1219(0.58) 4.2950(3.64)*** 3.6482(3.06)***
ε
g
tGood 0.1727(1.11) 0.1800(1.21) 1.1619(0.73) 2.0767(1.37)
εt
tBad -0.2719(-2.99)*** -0.2482(-2.87)*** -0.5951(-3.31)*** -0.4312(-2.30)**
εt
tGood -0.1597(-2.06)** -0.1634(-2.23)** 0.2672(0.77) 0.1330(0.39)
∆ˆ Yt 0.4103(4.79)*** - 0.7982(2.48)** -
∆ˆ YtBad - 0.2396(2.67)*** - 0.5716(1.82)*
∆ˆ YtGood - 0.6076(6.73)*** - 1.0025(3.12)***
Nobs 302 302 233 233
NofBad Times 146 146 105 105
R2 0.519 0.564 0.490 0.552
X2 (and p-values) for bg=gg 0.00(0.9545) 0.05(0.8231) 2.57(0.1091) 0.66(0.4178)
X2 :bt=gt 0.91(0.3390) 0.58(0.4461) 5.13(0.0235) 2.08(0.1488)
X2 : b∆ˆ Yt = g∆ˆ Yt - 22.06(0.0000) - 3.84(0.0501)
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
For the high LTV group the results are analogous as before, with contractionary spending
shocks being more important in Bad times (table 16 and 16.1, appendix). Similarly, contractionary
tax shocks in Bad times and expansionary tax shocks in Good times aﬀect signiﬁcantly private
consumption expenditure, but their eﬀects are not statistically diﬀerent from the corresponding
eﬀects in cases of expansionary or contractionary tax shocks in Bad or Cood times, respectively.
With regard to the low-LTV group, as before, expansionary spending shocks and contractionary
tax shocks are most eﬀective in Bad times, i.e. an increase in spending increases consumption
w h i l ea ni n c r e a s ei nt a x a t i o nd e c r e a s e sc o n s u m p t i o nt oag r e a te x t e n t ,o rat a xc u ti nB a dt i m e s
when tax policy followed is contractionary raises the most private consumption. Moreover, in
Good times consumption is boosted the most by an expansionary tax shock, i.e. a tax cut.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h eD 3d e ﬁnition of Bad times that makes use of the cyclical component of the
unemployment rate the eﬀects of spending shocks on private consumption for the high LTV group
follow the same pattern as with the ﬁrst deﬁnition of Bad times, i.e. the coeﬃcients are much
bigger and signiﬁcant only in Bad times. Tax shocks appear to have a relatively stronger eﬀect
in Good times, though this is not supported by relevant Chi-square tests. The disposable income
proxy has signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient estimates in both Good and Bad times, moreover we
cannot reject the null of a similar eﬀect in both states of nature. When examining the coeﬃcient
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high LTV group, in addition the eﬀect in Bad times is more pronounced compared to that in Good
times. The tax shocks have coeﬃcients of bigger magnitude compared to the high LTV group in
Bad times, with their eﬀect being insigniﬁcantly estimated in Good times. The disposable income
proxy has a bigger eﬀect on private consumption relative to the high LTV group, having a more
pronounced eﬀect during recessions as expected.
TABLE 7: D3
Variables 1234
- H-LTV H-LTV L-LTV L-LTV
ε
g
tBad 0.4269(2.22)** 0.4297(2.23)** 2.9340(2.00)** 3.5925(2.55)***
ε
g
tGood 0.0074(0.05) 0.0200(0.12) 1.1154(0.88) 0.2346(0.19)
εt
tBad -0.1758(-1.98)** -0.1754(-1.96)** -0.6162(-3.53)*** -0.7477(-4.36)***
εt
tGood -0.2272(-2.82)*** -0.2338(-2.90)*** -0.0242(-0.09) 0.1615(0.63)
∆ˆ Yt 0.3971(4.60)*** - 0.6547(1.83)* -
∆ˆ YtBad - 0.3352(3.34)*** - 0.8843(2.42)**
∆ˆ YtGood - 0.4369(4.61)*** - 0.4907(1.37)
Nobs 302 302 233 233
NofBad Times 150 150 120 120
R2 0.519 0.519 0.474 0.522
X2 (and p-values) for bg=gg 2.67(0.1019) 2.57(0.1090) 0.91(0.3410) 3.12(0.0772)
X2 :bt=gt 0.18(0.6700) 0.23(0.6307) 3.85(0.0498) 8.32(0.0039)
X2 : b∆ˆ Yt = g∆ˆ Yt - 1.25(0.2631) - 3.33(0.0681)
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
With respect to the high LTV group, as before contractionary spending shocks in Bad times
aﬀect mostly private consumption (table 17 and 17.1, Appendix). Tax shocks, contractionary or
expansionary, in Good times aﬀect in an analogous manner consumption, while only expansionary
tax shocks are signiﬁcant in Bad times, though the results produced are not statistically diﬀerent
from the eﬀects of an contractionary tax shock. On the contrary, expansionary spending shocks
generate a very pronounced eﬀect in Bad times for the low-LTV group, which though does not
diﬀer much from the coeﬃcient estimate of a contractionary spending action in Bad times; however
it signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the impact of a speding expansion on private consumption in Good
times. Tax eﬀects are mostly important in Bad times, with the expansionary and contractionary
eﬀects being of symmetric nature.
The results for the high LTV group generated using the deﬁnition D4 are analogous to those
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the spending shocks in Bad times are smaller and not signiﬁcant. In Good times their eﬀects are
negative. Tax shocks have negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients only in Bad times, moreover they
are bigger than for the high LTV group. Whereas, the disposable income proxy has a stronger
eﬀect than for the high LTV group, having a relatively bigger coeﬃcient in Bad times, however
this is not supported by relevant Chi-square tests conducted.
TABLE 8: D4
Variables 1234
- H-LTV H-LTV L-LTV L-LTV
ε
g
tBad 0.1941(1.01) 0.2425(1.31) 1.6024(1.29) 1.9921(1.58)
ε
g
tGood 0.1805(1.07) 0.1924(1.17) -0.1703(-0.13) -0.6860(-0.53)
εt
tBad -0.3080(-3.19)*** -0.3266(-3.48)*** -0.5583(-3.78)*** -0.6113(-4.01)***
εt
tGood -0.1515(-2.11)** -0.1761(-2.50)** 0.2617(1.02) 0.3801(1.46)
∆ˆ Yt 0.4010(4.62)*** - 0.7023(2.14)** -
∆ˆ YtBad - 0.2768(2.92)*** - 0.7923(2.35)**
∆ˆ YtGood - 0.566(6.09)*** - 0.5984(1.75)*
Nobs 302 302 233 233
NofBad Times 136 136 109 109
R2 0.516 0.549 0.545 0.554
X2 (and p-values) for bg=gg 0.00(0.9584) 0.04(0.842) 1.03(0.3108) 2.22(0.1358)
X2 :bt=gt 1.74(0.1877) 1.69(0.193) 8.44(0.0037) 10.85(0.0010)
X2 : b∆ˆ Yt = g∆ˆ Yt - 12.91(0.0003) - 0.92(0.3378)
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
Contractionary speding shocks in Bad times and expansionary spending shocks in Good times
aﬀect consumption the most and in the most signiﬁcant manner (high-LTV group). Notice also
that we reject the joing null hypothesis that contractionary spending shocks have same eﬀects in
Bad and Good times, and that expansionary spending shocks have the same eﬀects in Bad and
Good times (table 18 and 18.1, Appendix). Tax hikes or tax cuts have symmetric eﬀects in Bad
times, similarly for Good times. In addition the Bad time eﬀects are analogous to the Good time
eﬀects of taxation when consider together the contractionary and expansionary tax shocks. In the
low-LTV group, we obtain signiﬁcant eﬀects for the contractionary spending shock in Bad times,
contrary to what we had seen so far, but the eﬀects are not statistically diﬀerent with respect
to those in Good times or the expansionary speding shock in Bad times. Tax shocks appear
marginally signiﬁcant in Bad times. Tax hikes or tax cuts have stronger eﬀects in Bad times than
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where we cannot reject the null of a common coeﬃcient in Bad and Good times for contractionary
and expansionary shocks, respectively. Though, one should keep in mind that this last deﬁnition
of Bad times (as well as deﬁnition D2) is related more to changing economic conditions than severe
recession episodes.
Overall the results obtained under both narrow (D1 and D2) and broad notions of slowdown
in economic activity (D3 and D4) provide support for the presence of asymmetric eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy in high and low LTV groups. Under all deﬁnitions tax shocks reduce consumption the
most in Bad times in the low LTV group, while it appears that they have a negative eﬀect of
a similar magnitude during both Good and Bad times when considering the high LTV group.
Furthermore, the eﬀect of a tax shock in Bad times is much bigger when analyzing the low LTV
group. Moreover, after decomposing tax shock into their contractionary and expansionary part
and when considering solely periods that refer to economic recessions as deﬁned by D1 and D3,
we see that tax policy appears eﬀective both in Bad and Good times for the high-LTV group.
Particularly, contractionary tax shock (i.e. a tax hike or a tax cut when tax policy was previously
set in a contractionary manner) during more severe recession episodes as those described by D1
and expansionary tax shocks (tax cuts) during less severe recession episodes like those described by
D3, as well as expansionary tax shocks in Good times (i.e. a tax cut). Tax shocks exert their bigger
eﬀect on private consumption in Bad times in the low-LTV group, speciﬁcally the contractionary
tax component (both for narrow and broader deﬁnitions of economic recessions), i.e. a tax cut in
Bad times, when policy was previously conducted in contractionary manner, boosts signiﬁcantly
private consumption (the opposite if we consider a tax cut). The expansionary component of tax
shocks is eﬀective in Bad times, only in cases of less severe recession episodes (like D3).
Government spending shocks appear to aﬀect consumption expenditure the most during re-
cessions in both LTV groups, however the eﬀect is much more pronounced in countries with less
developed ﬁnancial systems as was anticipated. Additionally, in the high-LTV group it is contrac-
tionary spending shocks that aﬀect consumption the most, i.e. a spending cut during a recession
period has devastating eﬀects on consumption, or a spending increase in a recession period, when
ﬁscal policy was pursued in an contractionary manner boosts eﬀectively private consumption. On
the other hand, it is expansionary spending shocks that raise private consumption in Bad times
for the low-LTV group, because in the presence of binding liquidity constraints an increase in
spending raises disposable income encouranging people to increase their spending. The disposable
income proxy has positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects in both LTV groups, with the eﬀect being much
stronger for the low LTV group as expected. In addition, there is limited evidence (based on D1,
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contrary, when considering the high LTV group, in most cases, there is clear evidence of a bigger
coeﬃcient in Good times.
Therefore, ﬁscal policy has asymmetric eﬀects over the business cycle in the two LTV groups.
Spending appears to be more eﬀective in Bad times for both LTV groups, though it is much more
eﬀective in boosting private consumption and moving the economy out of a recession in countries
with less developed ﬁnancial markets for consumer credit as can be judge from the magnitude of
the coeﬃcient estimates. Notice also that while spending increases are eﬀective in Bad times in less
ﬁnancially developed economies in boosting private consumption, particularly when ﬁscal policy
was conducted in a countercyclical manner (positive spending shocks), in economies where access to
consumer credit is easier, spending increases are aﬀecting the most consumption when ﬁscal policy
was conducted before in a procyclical manner (negative spending shocks). On the other hand, tax
policy is more potent in aﬀecting private demand during severe recession episodes in less ﬁnancially
developed economies (particularly if tax policy was conducted before in an contractionary manner),
whereas in upturns of economic activity its eﬀect is minimal. On the contrary, in more ﬁnancially
developed economies the eﬀectiveness of tax policy is equally important in upturns and downturns
of economic activity (especially if initially it was conducted in a contractionary manner in Bad
times, and in an expansionary manner in Good times).
In the presence of a countercyclical ﬁscal rule, during recession episodes ﬁscal policy in the
low LTV group shares (or drives) the stabilization properties of the whole OECD sample case, i.e.
ﬁscal policy (both spending and taxation) is more eﬀective in mitigating recessions rather than
muting expansions, with respect to its eﬀect on private consumption. Alternatively, ﬁscal policy
actions are more able in shorthening recessions than lengthening expansions. Whereas, for the
high LTV group, an increase in spending boosts private expenditure only in Bad times as for the
low LTV group, however tax policy is equally eﬀective under all states of nature. This is due to
the fact that taxation has a direct eﬀect on individuals’ income and since most people can smooth
their consumption at all times, tax changes will have similar eﬀects under all states of nature.
4.2.1.2 Robustness Test Nevertheless, the results obtained so far might be aﬀected by the
fact that some or all the countries that have been categorized to the low-LTV group have switched
status from 1995 onwards, due to ﬁnancial liberalization. According to Jappelli and Pagano (1994),
the LTV ratio was 60% in Austria and Japan and Portugal, 75% in Belgium and Netherlands,
50% in Greece, and 56% in Italy in 1994. We shall explore how our results change if we assign
Belgium and Netherlands in the high LTV group from 1995 onwards. A similar exercise will be
done for the other two groups of countries i.e. Austria, Japan and Portugal, and ﬁnally Italy and
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Under all deﬁnitions of Bad times the results remain qualitatively similar both for the high
and low LTV categories, the only diﬀerence is in quantitative terms. Speciﬁcally the coeﬃcients
of all variables in most cases become bigger, in absolute terms, especially in Bad times for the
low LTV group, whereas for the high LTV group the coeﬃcient estimates do not change much or
they decrease39. This implies that the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on private consumption is stronger in
recessions in the low LTV group, when fewer countries are characterized as having less ﬁnancially
developed economies overtime. This is true only if OECD countries are converging in terms
of the development of their ﬁnancial markets, and fewer countries or none is included in the
low LTV group after 19954041. Hence, in the event of convergence of ﬁnancial development and
harmonization of ﬁnancial systems in OECD countries overtime, all or most of the low LTV group
observations refer to the prior to 1995 period observations. In this case, ﬁscal policy (taxation and
government expenditure) in the low LTV group has greater impact on consumption especially in
Bad times, than if we allow the countries under consideration to be assigned to the low LTV group
after 1995. An explanation for this could be that ﬁscal policy has become less eﬀective in boosting
output and private demand overtime in the event of ﬁnacial liberalization and abolishment of
restrictions on credit availability to consumers42.
39Results are available upon request.
40When we assign Belgium and Netherland to the high LTV countries after 1995 the high LTV observations
increase from 302 to 316 and the low LTV observations decrease from 233 to 219. After including Japan, Portugal
and Austria in the high LTV group the observation becomes 337 and 198, respectively for the high and low LTV
countries. Finally, after including Greece and Italy in the high LTV group the observations used in the regressions
are 351 and 184 respectively for the high and low LTV groups.
41With respect to D1, after the reassignment of Belgium and Netherlands to the high LTV group after 1995 we
have 154 and 107 Bad time episodes, respectively for the high and low LTV groups. When reassigning Austria,
Japan and Portugal we get 163 and 98 episodes of Bad times respecitvely in high and low LTV groups. After
reassigning Greece and Italy to the high LTV group after 1995 we get 169 and 92 episodes of bad times, respectively
in the two LTV groups. With respect to D2 the number of Bad times is 151 and 100 after the ﬁrst reassignment,
they become 159 and 92 after the second, while after the third reassignment they become 166 and 85 respectively
for the high and low LTV groups. When considering D3 we have 163 and 98, then 168 and 98 and ﬁnally 176 and
90 Bad time episodes in high and low LTV groups. For D4 we have 139 and 106, then 147 and 98 after the second
reassignment to the high LTV group, whereas after the third reassignment we have 152 and 92 Bad time episodes,
respectively for the high and low LTV groups.
42Perotti (2002) examined the ﬁscal multiplier in the US, UK, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand and discussed
the possibility of declined potency of ﬁscal policy after the 1980. Tagkalakis (2003) established the declining eﬃcacy
of ﬁscal policy in aﬀecting output through the employment channel, in the UK over the last 20 years.
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This paper has presented in a simple theoretical framework the idea that ﬁscal policy can have
asymmetric eﬀects on consumption in recessions and expansions in the presence of binding liquidity
constraints. Fiscal policy will be more eﬀective in stimulating private consumption and pushing the
economy out of a recession, when liquidity constraints bind for a large fraction of the population.
This idea was investigated empirically on a panel of nineteen OECD countries.
Before characterizing periods of expansions and recessions using alternative deﬁnitions, we
showed that, in OECD countries, ﬁscal policy has Keynesian eﬀects on private consumption ex-
penditure, i.e. a spending shock has a positive eﬀect and a tax shock has a negative eﬀect on
private consumption, with the spending eﬀect being more pronounced. Moreover, it is expansion-
ary spending shocks that exert the bigger eﬀect on private consumption rather than contractionary
spending shocks, while contractionary and expansionary tax shocks aﬀect symmetrically private
consumption. After considering recession and expansion episodes, we found that both tax and
spending shocks aﬀect consumption changes in Bad times more than in Good times. This is
due to the fact that expansionary spending shocks in Bad times are aﬀecting the most private
consumption, while both contractionary and expansionary tax shocks are important in Bad times.
Following Jappelli and Pagano (1994), we used as a proxy for credit constraints the maximum
ratio of the loan to the value of the house in housing mortgages (LTV ratio), and we assigned
country-decade observations to a high and low LTV group following the work of Perotti (1999).
Using this measure we showed that ﬁscal policy has asymmetric eﬀects in high and low LTV
groups. Speciﬁcally, a spending shock has much more pronounced eﬀects in the low LTV group
than in the high LTV group (particularly an expansionary spending shock), similarly for the tax
shock, though the results appear to be less signiﬁcant (in this case the diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant when considering the eﬀects of a contractionary tax shock).
After introducing in the analysis the alternative recession and expansion categorizations we
found that the results provide evidence for the presence of asymmetric eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in
upturns and downturns in countries with more and less developed consumer credit markets. In
most cases considered, tax shocks reduce consumption the most in Bad times when analyzing the
low LTV group (for the most imprtant recession episodes (D1) this is attributed to the contrac-
tionary tax shock component, i.e. a tax cut in Bad times, when policy was previously conducted
in contractionary manner, boosts signiﬁcantly private consumption (whereas a tax hike decreases
consumption); while it appears that they have a negative eﬀect of a similar magnitude during both
Good and Bad times when considering the high LTV group [particularly contractionary policy in
Bad times (i.e. a tax hike or a tax cut when tax policy was previously set in a contractionary man-
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(D1)]. Moreover, the eﬀect of a tax shock in Bad times is much bigger in the low LTV group.
Government spending shocks aﬀect private consumption expenditure the most during recessions
in both LTV groups, nevertheless the eﬀect is much stronger in countries with less developed
ﬁnancial systems as was anticipated. Though this eﬀect originates from a diﬀerent components of
the spending shock in the two groups, i.e. in the high-LTV group it is contractionary spending
shocks that aﬀect consumption the most, i.e. a spending cut during a recession period decreases
to a great extent private consumption, alternatively a spending increase in a recession period,
when ﬁscal policy was pursued in an contractionary manner boosts eﬀectively private consump-
tion. On the other hand, for the low-LTV group it is expansionary spending shocks that raise
private consumption in Bad times. These hold both for narrow (D1) and broad (D3) deﬁnitions of
recession episodes. This can be explained by the fact that credit constraints bind for more people
in economies with less developed consumer credit markets, as well as, by the fact that during deep
recession episodes credit constraints bind for a larger fraction of the population, both in more and
less developed consumer credit markets.
The normative aspect of this analysis points to the need for discretionary ﬁscal policy actions as
a way of mitigating economic slumps Both tax policy and government spending is eﬀective in Bad
times in all OECD countries no matter what the level of their ﬁnancial development is, however
their eﬀects are much bigger in countries where consumers have limited access to credit markets.
In addition, it appears the case that when ﬁscal policy is conducted in a procyclical manner, i.e.
negative spending shocks and positive tax shocks in recessions then a switch to a countercyclical
strategy (spending increases and tax cuts) could improve signiﬁcantly consumption outcomes.
Moreover, unless OECD countries (and speciﬁcally EMU countries) are converging overtime in
the degree of development of their ﬁnancial systems there are reasons for not impairing ﬁscal
ﬂexibility by stringent ﬁscal rules (such as the Stability and Growth Pact).
There are two caveats in our analysis that can be treated, though, as future extensions. First of
all characterizing cyclical ﬂuctuations with yearly data is clearly problematic, business cycles and
recessions and expansions can be better characterized by the use of quarterly data. Nevertheless,
we have decided to carry on with the analysis beneﬁting from the bigger information set, since
yearly ﬁscal policy data are available for more countries. Therefore future work could be also
directed towards conducting the analysis only for those countries that have ﬁscal policy data
reported in a quarterly frequency; which will allow a better identiﬁcation of the ﬁscal policy
shocks. It is likely that our spending and tax shocks are not puriﬁed from GDP feedbacks within
a year, hence ﬁscal shocks are not exogenous.
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consumer credit constraints (as thoroughly explained by Jappelli and Pagano (1994)) might not
be valid anymore in case the nineteen OECD countries are converging in terms of their degree of
ﬁnancial development. This will probably aﬀect the nature of consumption response to a change
in ﬁscal policy. Nevertheless, we have decided to trade oﬀ t h i sw i t ht h ef a c tt h a tO E C Dd a t aa r e
of higher-quality. Credit constraints are expected to be binding for more people in non-OECD
countries. In that case it would be more meaningful to examine the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on
consumption in a group of non-OECD countries relative to a group of OECD countries, given
that the ﬁrst would probably be less ﬁnancially developed, with a big fraction of their population
having no access to credit markets43.
Future research, already under way, examines the eﬀects of another big component of public
policy over the business cycle i.e. government transfers. Another interesting aspect of the model
that requires further investigation is the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy changes of disposable income and its
components, i.e. real wages, wage bill, employment, as well as, assets’ rates of return. Moreover,
there is scope for future research on the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal rules over the in expansions and re-
cessions (and the evaluation of cyclical movements of government expenditure and revenue) and its
interaction with monetary policy. Last but not least, there is scope for a fully developed theoret-
ical model; this could incorporate also distortionary taxation and deﬁcit ﬁnancing of government
spending.
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7.1 Maximum LTV ratio44 versus domestic credit to the private sector as a
percent of GDP45
Table 9
Countries Maximum LTV ratio Domestic Credit to Private sector as a percentage of GDP
1980-1994 1980 1994 2001
Australia high 26.279 67.897 89.765
Austria low 73.355 91.658 106.890
Belgium low 29.645 76.004 77.069
Canada high 66.726 78.004 80.753
Germany high 74.785 101.680 121.040
Denmark high 40.808 31.128 141.790
Spain high 67.577 74.556 105.880
Finland high 47.485 69.759 57.672
France high 102.130 87.906 89.813
United Kingdom high 27.625 109.450 138.840
Greece low 43.757 31.019 38.139
Ireland high 29.037 45.245 111.820
Italy low 55.991 59.527 79.978
Japan low 131.080 203.170 186.750
Netherlands low 90.393 88.229 142.600
Norway high 51.386 71.445 82.840
Portugal low 73.158 62.666 146.200
Sweden high 75.930 108.920 104.650
United States high 78.458 95.673 145790
Even if a country has a big domestic credit (to the private sector) to GDP ratio, i.e it is char-
acterized by high level of ﬁnancial intermediation, this does not necessarily imply that consumers
will have easy access to credit; this is the case with Japan and Austria and Netherlands as can
be seen in Table 946. On the other hand, easier access to consumer credit, does not necessarily
lead to a larger fraction of credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, as is the case for
Australia, Finland, France and Norway. Therefore, there other factors that determine consumers’
behavior towards credit, even cultural factors. Hence, the LTV ratio being a supply side factor,
44High indicates above 80 percent and low below 80 percent.
45Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
46The 2001 entry for Sweden corresponds to 1999 information.
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availability of credit to consumers, irrespective of their preferences towards credit.
However, supply determined conditions, like the maximum LTV ratio, are probably adjusted
in a way that follows the cyclical economic conditions and the ability of individuals to repay their
loans. So that the maximum LTV might be higher in upturns and lower in downturns, moreover
they are probably adjusted in a way that takes into account the changing value of collaterals over
the cycle (collateral value increases in upturns so consumers will have better terms and conditions
when obtaining a loan, while the opposite might be true when the economy is down the cycle).
An other point that deserves attention is that the last twenty years are characterized by
increasing ﬁnancial liberalization in all OECD countries, which could be infered by comparing
the 1980 and 2001 values of credit to private sector as a percent of GDP. Abolishment of credit
c o n s t r a i n t sm u s th a v eb o o s t e dt h ec r e d i tt oG D Pratio if credit constraints were binding. An
argument that is relevant for Austria, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal. Furthermore, if ﬁnancial
liberalization is the case then the country-decade categorization of the LTV measure might be
very crude in capturing this eﬀects.
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EUI WP ECO 2004/197.2 Fiscal shocks: Decomposition into expansionary and contractionary com-
ponents
TABLE 11
Variables OECD HLTV LLTV
ε
g
tCon 0.0425(0.04) 0.1962(0.86) 0.6147(0.39)
ε
g
tExp 4.3423(3.69)*** 0.1319(0.53) 5.5095(3.91)***
εt
tCon -0.6386(-3.88)*** -0.1434(-1.45) -0.7774(-4.12)***
εt
tExp -0.5286(-1.46) -0.2750(-2.45)** -1.0306(-1.02)





tExp 4.70(0.0302)+ 0.02(0.8747)+ 4.02(0.0449)+
εt
tCon = εt
tExp 0.07(0.791)+ 0.56(0.4545)+ 0.06(0.8120)+
Joint 5.57(0.0619)+ 0.56(0.7540)+ 4.99 (0.0824)+
Nobs 535 302 233
R2 0.376 0.515 0.460
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signiﬁcance, respectively.
+Chi-square tests, p-values in parenthesis
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Joint for HLTV-LLTV (X2(2)) 3.54(0.1702)+
Nobs 535
R2 0.424
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signiﬁcance, respectively,
+Chi-square tests, p-values in parenthesis.
45
EUI WP ECO 2004/19TABLE 13
V a r i a b l e s D 1D 1D 2D 2
ε
g
tBad(Exp) 5.842(4.04)*** 5.730(3.96)*** 5.466(3.68)*** 5.690(4.08)***
ε
g
tBad(Con) 0.903(0.59) 1.147(0.74) 0.525(0.34) -1.027(-0.67)
ε
g
tGood(Exp) 0.715(0.77) 1.111(1.30) 1.410(1.25) 0.345(0.34)
ε
g
tGood(Con) 0.191(0.14) -0.546(-0.44) 0.018(0.01) 1.692(1.43)
εt
tBad(Exp) -0.606(-1.07) -0.470(-0.85) 0.666(0.90) 0.271(0.39)
εt
tBad(Con) -0.842(-4.33)*** -0.846(-4.38)*** -0.712(-3.53)*** -0.642(-3.40)***
εt
tGood(Exp) -0.701(-2.13)** -0.686(-2.08)** -1.563(-4.33)*** -1.471(-4.43)***
εt
tGood(Con) -0.033(-0.08) 0.0417(0.10) 0.316(1.06) 0.375(1.35)
∆ˆ Yt 0.642(2.07)** - 0.624(2.19)** -
∆ˆ YtBad - 0.705(2.16)** - 0.291(1.00)
∆ˆ YtGood - 0.522(1.58) - 0.891(3.13)
Nobs 535 535 535 535
R2 0.428 0.435 0.468 0.539
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
TABLE 13.1




















tBad(Exp) 10.23(0.001) 8.53(0.003) 5.52(0.018) 11.15(0.000)
εt
tBad(Exp)=εt
tBad(Con) 0.14(0.705) 0.38(0.540) 3.09(0.079) 1.57(0.210)
εt
tGood(Exp)=εt
tGood(Con) 1.49(0.222) 1.78(0.182) 11.59(0.000) 12.80(0.000)
εt
tBad(Con)=εt
tGood(Con) 2.69(0.100) 3.18(0.074) 8.55(0.003) 9.60(0.001)
εt
tGood(Exp)=εt














tBad(Exp) 2.70(0.259) 3.25(0.196) 12.81(0.001) 11.98(0.002)
∆ˆ YtBad=∆ˆ YtGood - 0.61(0.433) - 7.04(0.008)
p-values in parenthesis
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EUI WP ECO 2004/19TABLE 14
V a r i a b l e s D 3D 3D 4D 4
ε
g
tBad(Exp) 4.207(2.49)** 3.882(2.34)** -0.207(-0.29) -0.264(-0.36)
ε
g
tBad(Con) 1.031(0.70) 1.610(1.09) 1.749(1.31) 1.946(1.45)
ε
g
tGood(Exp) 0.303(0.27) 0.987(1.02) 0.026(0.02) 0.425(0.38)
ε
g
tGood(Con) 0.587(0.41) -0.508(-0.38) 0.019(0.01) -0.923(-0.63)
εt
tBad(Exp) -1.010(-2.89)*** -0.839(-2.50)** -1.289(-1.86)* -1.14(-1.68)*
εt
tBad(Con) -0.731(-3.93)*** -0.743(-4.11)*** -0.379(-3.11)*** -0.393(-3.28)***
εt
tGood(Exp) -0.365(-0.65) -0.445(-0.84) -0.373(-1.42) -0.378(-1.46)
εt
tGood(Con) 0.130(0.59) 0.051(0.26) 0.255(1.15) 0.222(1.02)
∆ˆ Yt 0.642(2.06)** - 0.650(2.20)** -
∆ˆ YtBad - 0.792(2.41)** - 0.714(2.34)**
∆ˆ YtGood - 0.470(1.46) - 0.517(1.61)
Nobs 535 535 535 535
R2 0.449 0.475 0.500 0.509
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
TABLE 14.1




















tBad(Exp) 4.61(0.031) 2.78(0.095) 0.05(0.823) 0.40(0.529)
εt
tBad(Exp)=εt
tBad(Con) 0.41(0.521) 0.05(0.819) 1.68(0.195) 1.19(0.275)
εt
tGood(Exp)=εt
tGood(Con) 0.59(0.442) 0.65(0.420) 2.23(0.135) 2.08(0.149)
εt
tBad(Con)=εt
tGood(Con) 9.87(0.001) 9.62(0.001) 7.05(0.007) 6.80(0.009)
εt
tGood(Exp)=εt














tBad(Exp) 12.98(0.001) 12.63(0.001) 11.13(0.003) 10.63(0.004)
∆ˆ YtBad=∆ˆ YtGood - 1.89(0.169) - 0.76(0.384)
p-values in parenthesis
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EUI WP ECO 2004/19TABLE 15: D1
Variables 12 3 4
- H-LTV H-LTV L-LTV L-LTV
ε
g
tBad(Exp) 0.040(0.12) 0.092(0.28) 6.746(4.32)*** 6.646(4.27)***
ε
g
tBad(Con) 0.954(2.87)*** 0.890(2.62)*** 2.221(1.17) 2.402(1.25)
ε
g
tGood(Exp) 0.002(0.01) -0.036(-0.12) 1.049(0.62) 1.917(1.13)
ε
g
tGood(Con) -0.118(-0.46) -0.087(-0.34) 0.165(0.08) -1.301(-0.51)
εt
tBad(Exp) -0.091(-0.58) -0.105(-0.66) -2.343(-1.32) -1.914(-1.06)
εt
tBad(Con) -0.342(-2.33)** -0.335(-2.27)** -0.951(-4.57)*** -0.952(-4.59)***
εt
tGood(Exp) -0.317(-2.37)** -0.317(-2.38)** -0.765(-1.01) -0.897(-1.25)
εt
tGood(Con) -0.088(-0.81) -0.097(-0.88) -0.244(-0.22) -0.159(-0.14)
∆ˆ Yt 0.383(4.44)*** - 0.536(1.53) -
∆ˆ YtBad - 0.342(3.38)*** - 0.604(1.67)*
∆ˆ YtGood - 0.406(4.22)*** - 0.371(0.97)
Nobs 302 302 233 233
R2 0.545 0.543 0.512 0.517
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
TABLE 15.1:D1




















tBad(Exp) 0.01(0.926) 0.09(0.762) 6.23(0.012) 4.20(0.040)
εt
tBad(Exp)=εt
tBad(Con) 0.98(0.322) 0.80(0.371) 0.58(0.446) 0.27(0.605)
εt
tGood(Exp)=εt
tGood(Con) 1.33(0.249) 1.22(0.269) 0.14(0.707) 0.28(0.595)
εt
tBad(Con)=εt
tGood(Con) 2.36(0.124) 2.01(0.156) 0.40(0.526) 0.49(0.483)
εt
tGood(Exp)=εt














tBad(Exp) 2.95(0.228) 2.48(0.289) 1.10(0.578) 0.83(0.658)
∆ˆ YtBad=∆ˆ YtGood - 0.44(0.509) - 0.73(0.393)
p-values in parenthesis
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EUI WP ECO 2004/19TABLE 16: D2
Variables 12 3 4
- H-LTV H-LTV L-LTV L-LTV
ε
g
tBad(Exp) -0.590(-1.58) -0.431(-1.16) 6.370(4.43)*** 6.559(4.72)***
ε
g
tBad(Con) 0.789(2.32)** 0.584(1.71)* -0.535(-0.31) -1.555(-0.89)
ε
g
tGood(Exp) 0.357(1.25) 0.282(1.00) 1.600(0.76) -0.105(-0.05)
ε
g
tGood(Con) -0.002(-0.01) 0.085(0.33) 1.042(0.43) 4.075(1.64)
εt
tBad(Exp) -0.1767(-1.04) -0.243(-1.43) 2.497(1.53) 1.587(1.01)
εt
tBad(Con) -0.222(-1.75)* -0.189(-1.52) -0.848(-4.41)*** -0.790(-4.23)***
εt
tGood(Exp) -0.303(-2.30)** -0.279(-2.16)** -4.721(-4.68)*** -4.009(-4.46)***
εt
tGood(Con) 0.0674(0.48) 0.008(0.06) 0.259(0.69) 0.392(1.10)
∆ˆ Yt 0.428(5.27)*** - 0.625(2.12)** -
∆ˆ YtBad - 0.318(3.52)*** - 0.327(1.05)
∆ˆ YtGood - 0.554(5.90)*** - 0.891(3.01)***
Nobs 305 305 233 233
R2 0.571 0.582 0.577 0.622
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
TABLE 16.1:D2




















tBad(Exp) 4.78(0.028) 2.67(0.102) 3.61(0.057) 7.51(0.006)
εt
tBad(Exp)=εt
tBad(Con) 0.04(0.848) 0.05(0.821) 4.00(0.045) 2.17(0.140)
εt
tGood(Exp)=εt
tGood(Con) 2.56(0.109) 1.57(0.209) 18.07(0.000) 16.57(0.000)
εt
tBad(Con)=εt
tGood(Con) 2.50(0.113) 1.18(0.278) 6.85(0.008) 8.53(0.003)
εt
tGood(Exp)=εt














tBad(Exp) 2.51(0.284) 1.23(0.540) 17.80(0.000) 14.74(0.000)
∆ˆ YtBad=∆ˆ YtGood - 6.67(0.009) - 6.20(0.012)
p-values in parenthesis
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EUI WP ECO 2004/19TABLE 17: D3
Variables 12 3 4
- H-LTV H-LTV L-LTV L-LTV
ε
g
tBad(Exp) 0.215(0.60) 0.306(0.86) 7.742(2.75)*** 7.184(2.63)***
ε
g
tBad(Con) 0.676(2.06)** 0.601(1.84)* 2.686(1.47) 3.218(1.76)*
ε
g
tGood(Exp) 0.066(0.22) 0.024(0.08) -0.372(-0.16) 1.614(0.72)
ε
g
tGood(Con) -0.058(-0.21) -0.004(-0.02) 1.426(0.66) -1.002(-0.42)
εt
tBad(Exp) -0.329(-2.16)** -0.365(-2.33)** -2.721(-2.64)*** -2.458(-2.46)**
εt
tBad(Con) -0.004(-0.02) 0.040(0.24) -1.039(-3.67)*** -1.027(-3.75)***
εt
tGood(Exp) -0.273(-1.74)* -0.250(-1.58) -0.316(-0.25) -1.011(-0.89)
εt
tGood(Con) -0.185(-1.60) -0.211(-1.80)* 0.273(0.65) -0.003(-0.01)
∆ˆ Yt 0.409(4.72)*** - 0.609(1.84)* -
∆ˆ YtBad - 0.325(3.19)*** - 0.733(2.15)**
∆ˆ YtGood - 0.460(4.54)*** - 0.340(0.97)
Nobs 302 302 233 233
R2 0.522 0.518 0.520 0.542
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
TABLE 17.1:D3




















tBad(Exp) 0.12(0.728) 0.42(0.516) 4.89(0.027) 2.47(0.115)
εt
tBad(Exp)=εt
tBad(Con) 1.50(0.221) 2.16(0.142) 2.15(0.142) 1.65(0.198)
εt
tGood(Exp)=εt
tGood(Con) 0.16(0.692) 0.03(0.861) 0.17(0.684) 0.56(0.455)
εt
tBad(Con)=εt
tGood(Con) 0.91(0.340) 1.61(0.204) 6.46(0.011) 4.41(0.035)
εt
tGood(Exp)=εt














tBad(Exp) 0.91(0.634) 1.63(0.441) 12.08(0.002) 8.88(0.011)
∆ˆ YtBad=∆ˆ YtGood - 1.61(0.204) - 2.42(0.119)
p-values in parenthesis
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EUI WP ECO 2004/19TABLE 18: D4
Variables 12 3 4
- H-LTV H-LTV L-LTV L-LTV
ε
g
tBad(Exp) -0.393(-1.03) -0.270(-0.72) -1.394(-0.91) -1.491(-0.98)
ε
g
tBad(Con) 0.552(1.99)** 0.543(2.01)** 3.019(1.70)* 3.125(1.76)*
ε
g
tGood(Exp) 0.496(1.70)* 0.407(1.42) -1.187(-0.53) -0.363(-0.16)
ε
g
tGood(Con) -0.301(-0.90) -0.132(-0.39) 0.126(0.05) -1.371(-0.53)
εt
tBad(Exp) -0.322(-1.87)* -0.409(-2.29)** -3.052(-1.82)* -2.557(-1.54)
εt
tBad(Con) -0.242(-1.65)* -0.206(-1.42) -0.267(-1.63) -0.283(-1.74)*
εt
tGood(Exp) -0.265(-2.09)** -0.250(-1.99)** -0.277(-0.34) -0.384(-0.48)
εt
tGood(Con) -0.075(-0.66) -0.110(-0.96) 0.463(1.19) 0.365(0.94)
∆ˆ Yt 0.425(5.07)*** - 0.617(1.88)* -
∆ˆ YtBad - 0.329(3.43)*** - 0.685(2.03)**
∆ˆ YtGood - 0.536(5.52)*** - 0.457(1.26)
Nobs 305 305 233 233
R2 0.553 0.563 0.559 0.566
t-statistics in parenthesis (in X2 tests we report p-values).***, **,* statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of signif., respectively.
TABLE 18.1:D4




















tBad(Exp) 4.16(0.041) 2.44(0.118) 0.01(0.930) 0.20(0.657)
εt
tBad(Exp)=εt
tBad(Con) 0.10(0.754) 0.59(0.440) 2.56(0.109) 1.74(0.187)
εt
tGood(Exp)=εt
tGood(Con) 0.93(0.335) 0.50(0.478) 0.50(0.480) 0.52(0.472)
εt
tBad(Con)=εt
tGood(Con) 0.94(0.332) 0.30(0.583) 3.39(0.065) 2.58(0.108)
εt
tGood(Exp)=εt














tBad(Exp) 1.19(0.552) 1.21(0.545) 1.35(0.508) 5.93(0.051)
∆ˆ YtBad=∆ˆ YtGood - 4.73(0.029) - 0.82(0.365)
p-values in parenthesis
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EUI WP ECO 2004/19